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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.



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6.

THE following edition is intended chiefly for the Metaphysician. That reading, accordingly, has always been preferred which makes the argument more plain.

I am indebted to PROFESSOR DAVIES, of the Queen's College, Galway, for his careful revision of the proofs.

TRINITY COLLEGE,

January, 1882.

INTRODUCTION.

EXISTENCE is an aspect of thought. All existence is thought—thought either actual or possible. That is to say, every mode of existence, when grasped by cognition, would be found to be a mode of thought. Such is the position of the Idealist.

2. The Idealist thinks his case made out, because all such notions as Matter and Things in themselves, when examined, prove to be figments—figments made up of elements so incompatible, that to affirm the one is to deny the other. So Berkeley disposes of Matter, by the bare statement that what is inactive is not causal, and *vice versa*. The Idealist rejects a monster whose sole function is to fill a gap, where there is no gap.

3. The rejection of a zero, made up of incompatibilities which cancel one another, has nothing to do with the position of Plato and Hegel, that Existence, when analysed, yields opposite moments. This brings us to the question—What is Philosophy?

4. Philosophy makes explicit to thought what is implicitly contained in thought. Berkeley showed that Sensible Qualities are modes of consciousness. Kant showed that consciousness contained a Necessary and Universal element, meaning by *necessary* what is construed to thought as not possibly otherwise than it is; and by *universal* what is thought as exceptionless. These characteristics, Necessity and Universality, Hegel extended to the object, and so to the universe. Philosophy is thus the explicitness of universal thought.

5. The other day, G. H. Lewes, while showing that Physiology could not supersede Psychology, pointed out that while Force could be translated into Feeling, Feeling could not be expressed in Force. Thus the most advanced Empiricism is idealistic.

6. It may be said that Science will in time express Feeling in terms of Force—that it will translate Psychosis into Neurosis. Granted: it is nothing to the point: Neurosis is the antecedent, and so can never be the consequent. Psychosis—thought—will keep its coin of vantage.

7. According to the Idealist, thought is the only object of thought—thought is the sole instrument of thought; and the product of thought is thought.

8. The instrument of thought is thought only;

that is to say, we analyse a synthesis and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more; yet this process condemns as impossible the prevalent opinion that Psychology is Philosophy.

9. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge mixes various ingredients in a bowl. Everyone sees that this is Allegory. But when a Psychologist talks of the interaction of Subject and Object—of the action of the Object on the Subject, he is unconsciously allegorical.

10. The older hypothesis was that of Impulse, *e.g.* Locke's. Yet impulse implies weight, and weight, or gravity, is the result of the whole universe, and, so, cannot account for it. A billiard player may assume that the weight is in the ball; but a thinker ought to see that weight, or any property of a part, must be the result of the whole, and, so, cannot be prior to it. So of Force: it is another word for Movement, and cannot, therefore, originate.

11. So of Chemical Action: chemical action is only possible, because it is the result of certain conditions, and, therefore, cannot cause them. It is easy to say, let Oxygen represent the Subject, Hydrogen the Object, and Water—the result—Consciousness. But the chemist can retranslate: and the weight of the new product is that of the

old elements. Dewar has shown that old elements will form that new substance which is attended by the greatest evolution of heat. On the other hand, in the mental product the old constituents survive, and so the analogy breaks down on every point.

12. So, Psychology starts with a Subject and an Object; and by bringing the two into combination, and by feigning some reciprocal action—either mechanical or chemical—generates the Universe of Consciousness. As before, Subject and Object are results of consciousness at a certain stage, and, therefore, cannot generate it.

13. Des Cartes assumes an Ego, isolated from the rest of the Universe. It is obvious that the Ego is in contrast to the non-Ego; to evolve the non-Ego from the Ego is to offer a proof of that which the proof pre-supposes, and without which the proof would be unmeaning.

14. Locke's Essay is of value as a reply to the Psychology of Des Cartes. As a piece of philosophy, it assumes that there is a Mind on one side, and a set of Things on the other. It is mere Psychology.

15. Natural Realism is not Philosophy. Natural Realism tells us "that along with the presentation of the Object there is always a simultaneous presentation of the Subject, the two being mutually

related to each other."* True; but this postulates Subject and Object: that is, a Universe, and that Universe cut in two. It is mere Psychology.

16. Atomic theories cannot be Philosophy: they assume Space and Quantity; that is, from an aspect of the Universe they explain the whole.

17. Molecular theories cannot be Philosophy. To the assumptions of Atomism they add the assumption of Quality, and of Difference of Quality. Quality, like quantity and space, must be a result of the Universe. Clerk Maxwell considers that the family likeness of the molecules is an argument that they are not original.

18. Sir John Lubbock has calculated, on the authority of Loschmidt, Stoney, and Sir W. Thomson, that the molecules of gases are not more than the fifty-millionth part of an inch in diameter. It is obvious that any one of these molecules involves the whole problem of Natural Realism, and of the relation of Psychology to Philosophy. Sorby is of opinion that in a length of 1-80,000 of an inch there would probably be from 500 to 2000 molecules—500, for instance, in albumen, and 2000 in water. The nameless fraction of an inch presents us with space and its contents as surely as the field of the

* Monek's *Hamilton*, p. 83, n.

seventy-five millions of worlds, of one of which our earth is but a fraction.

19. Movement in the line of Least Resistance assumes Space, and a System of Pressures. Granting that Space and Motion are Metaphysical Ultima, Philosophy asks why Space and Motion are found in combination. How did the Atom acquire its tenure of Space, and why did Space tolerate the intrusion?

20. Evolution is not Philosophy. If a thing is evolved from within, the process is more than the mere accretion with which the doctrine starts. If the thing gathers material from without, like a rolling snowball, then the process belongs to Mechanics or to Chemistry.

21. "Life," as Virchow expresses it, "is the sum of the joint action of all parts, of the higher or vital ones as of the lower or inferior. There is no one seat of life, but every truly elementary part, especially every cell, is a seat of life." Granting that this statement gives us the results of Physiology, the philosopher must ask, "What brings 'the parts' into juxtaposition? Is it merely a case of juxtaposition, or how otherwise? What is a *part*? What is *higher*? What is *lower*? What is *joint action*?" Socrates would not have had much trouble with a man who described Life as the action of vital parts.

22. Huxley enunciates the hypothesis of Evolution thus:—"The successive species of animals and plants have arisen, the later by the gradual modification of the earlier." As before, if the modification be from within, the fact explodes the theory: if from without, modification is accretion.

23. Sir John Lubbock tells us that "an astonishing variety of most beautiful contrivances have been observed and described by many botanists, especially Hooker, Axel, Delpino, Hildebrand, Bennett, Fritz Müller, and above all Herman Müller and Darwin himself. The general result is, that to insects, and especially to bees, we owe the beauty of our gardens, the sweetness of our fields. To their beneficent, though unconscious action, flowers owe their scent and colour, their honey—nay, in many cases, their form. Their present shape and varied arrangements, their brilliant colours, their honey, and their sweet scent are all due to the selection exercised by insects. In these cases the relation between plants and insects is one of mutual advantage." A Platonist might put it thus: "Insects select flowers by selection." That is, the idea dominates the process, not *vice versa*. At all events, the process implies prior capacity, and therefore reserves for discussion What is Capacity, What is Relation. That is, Physical Science, as always, owes its existence to notions which its professors discard.

24. Professor Huxley, in referring to the nervous system as "that which co-ordinates and regulates Physiological units into an organic whole," uses more metaphysical terms than Virchow. That is, both use terms borrowed from thought to explain that which, according to them, is the explanation of thought. Neurosis is explained by Psychosis, while Neurosis is the only scientific explanation of Psychosis.

25. Spontaneous generation throws no light on Philosophy. Waiving the decisive objection that it would describe a process which takes place in Time, what does the doctrine amount to, if established? That a mixture of turnip-juice and cheese is, under certain conditions, an antecedent to life. The doctrine is invested with importance by the ignorant, who persist in obtruding on Science the notion Cause, which Science affects to discard.

26. The Scientist, to set aside Metaphysics, reduces Causation to Sequence. If Causation be Sequence only, Thought is not caused by Neurosis. But, in order to degrade Thought, he invests Neurosis with causal power, so that the destruction of Neurosis involves the destruction of Thought. Thought is the Whole of which Causation and Sequence in time are parts—very small parts, indeed.

27. Professor Williamson, in his opening address, gives a sketch of the theories which guided Chemis-

try fifty years ago, and of the changes wrought in them by fifty years' work. Chemical explanation has got rid of predisposing affinities. "Our present explanation" (of a certain phenomenon) "is a simple statement of the fact that under the conditions described, zinc displaces hydrogen from its sulphate." The statement is anything but simple, as it amounts to this:—zinc—one set of relations—displaces hydrogen—a second set of relations—from its sulphate—a third set of relations. A Hegelian would not ask for a more idealistic position than Professor Williamson's simple statement of the fact.

28. Physical Science is not Philosophy, for it requires antecedence and consequence only as an explicit basis. As an *explicit* basis, for the analysis of antecedence and consequence may lead to a great deal more. In fact, it led to the Idealism of Kant.

29. That Science is apparently content with antecedence and consequence is seen in Professor Burdon-Sanderson's address: "Science can hardly be said to begin until we have by experiment acquired such a knowledge of the relation between events and their antecedents, between processes and their products, that in our own sphere we are able to forecast the operations of Nature, even when they lie beyond the reach of desired observation." That is, we predict consequents, because they are caused.

30. Clifford and Lewes hold that the Uniformity of Nature ought to be expressed as the Law of the Collocations of Changes. That is, they merely postulate Simultaneity, Succession, and Fixed Order. What more could an Idealist require?

31. Herbert Spencer's Heredity may account for Necessity as a fact. It does not explain what the Idealist contends for—not merely that a notion is what it is, but that it is explicitly thought as not possibly otherwise—the Necessity of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel.

32. Mr. Whittaker, in the interest of Empiricism, reconciles Empiricism with Idealism: “in the final statement of Empiricism, ‘relations’ are just as fundamental as ‘feelings.’ All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between ‘feelings.’”^{*} Feelings are capable of primitive relations, simply because both presuppose one intelligible whole—the position of the Idealist.

33. Taking a portion of the Universe, in order to account for the Universe, is as idle as to suppose that a square on a chess-board is the cause of the board. There can be no fraction outside the whole, and the business of Philosophy must be analysis.

^{*} *Mind*, No. 24, p. 507.

34. Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato, in the *Parmenides*, analyses the Universe into τὸ ἐν and τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός; the position of τὸ ἐν explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.

(35. Positing τὸ εἶν, the Universe, as conceived by Plato, may be best described in the words of Hegel:* “Free and infinite Form, as a Totality, involves the principle of Matter in itself”—taking Form in his sense of Complete Whole of Characteristics. Without τὸ εἶν, we may have provisionally an Empiricism like that of Hume and Mill, *Parm.* 164 b; but this, when examined, will end in Nihilism, *Parm.* 165 e.)

36. The intelligible element, vindicated by Kant and elaborated by Hegel, is variously termed Ideas and Numbers. The Ideas and Numbers are substantially identical, but Idea denotes the intelligible in relation to the sensibility, while the Numbers are the movements of the pure, intelligible process.

37. Τὸ ἐν brings the *Parmenides* into close relation with the notices of Platonic doctrine preserved in Aristotle and his Scholiasts, as τὸ ἐν is the formative element in the Idea, and the spring from which the Numbers flow.

* *Logic*, p. 204, Wallace's translation.

38. Xenocrates has given a hypothetic genesis of the Ideas. It is only to assist apprehension, as *γένεσις* implies evolution in time, which of course does not apply to the Ideas. ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἰσασθέντων ἐγένοντο ἄν, εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτὰς ἦν γενέσθαι.—*Schol.* 828 a, 1, 2.)

39. Τὸ ἐν is neither Number nor Idea, although without it we should have neither Number nor Idea. Number—ἀριθμὸς—is, according to Greek arithmeticians, σύστημα μονάδων.—*Theon Smyrn.*

23. Τὸ ἐν is the ἀρχὴ of Numerables.

40. As τὸ ἐν has for its *contre-coup* τὸ ἄπειρον—*indefinite plasticity*—the first Number is the Dyad, αὐτοδυάς. That is, The One and τὸ ἄπειρον, as two items, constitute the System of Two Monads—ἡ αὐτοδυάς—the Prime Dyad.—*Arist. Met.* B. iii. The Dyad has for its Material τὸ ἄπειρον, and for its Form τὸ ἐν: αἱ πρῶτον γεγονυῖαι δύο μονάδες ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ Ἀρχικοῦ Ἐνὸς—τοῦ Αὐτοενὸς δηλονότι—αὐται πεποιή-
κασι τὴν πρώτην Δυάδα.—*Syrianus ap. Schol.* 818 b, 46–9.)

41. As the Indefinite Dyad is *Majus* and *Minus*—τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρὸν—each moiety is a monad. These two monads, with τὸ ἐν as unifier and equator, constitute the System of Three Monads—the Prime Triad—ἡ αὐτοτριάς: αἱ δὲ πάλιν δευτέρας γεγονυῖαι τρεῖς μονάδες, ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν καὶ αὐται

τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἶδους δὲ τοῦ Αὐτοενός, πεποιή-
 κασι τὴν Αὐτοτριάδα.—*Syr. ib.* 819*a*.

42. Lastly, the Indefinite Dyad as plastic, taking on itself the Prime Dyad as formal, constitutes the System of Four Monads—the Prime Tetrad—ἡ αὐτοτετράς: ἐκ τῆς Αὐτοδυάδος καὶ τῆς Ἀρχικοῦ Δυάδος ἦν Ἀόριστον καλεῖ Δυάδα, ἀπετέλουν τὴν Τετράδα· οὐ συντιθέντες αὐτὰς (*sc.* τὰς δυάδας) οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὔξοντες, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος διπλασιάσης τὴν Αὐτοδυάδα, καὶ οὕτως ἀποτεκούσης τὴν Τετράδα.—*Syr. ib.* 819*b*, 26–31.

43. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is no blank infinite. It is plasticity, ἀνεκλειπτός, *Syr. ib.* 907*a*, 25. Its virtues are best given in the words of Syrianus: κινήτικὴν οὖσαν ἀρχὴν πάντα τὰ εἶδη γονίμου πληροῦν δυνάμεως καὶ προάγειν εἰς ἀπογέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων αὐλῶν εἶδων.—*Syr. ib.* 906*b*, 30–32. δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων αὐλῶν εἶδων are the squares and cubes of the Prime Numbers.

44. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is the link between Plato's Physics and Metaphysics. It is Movement both logical and mechanical. All mechanical movement, whether purely mechanical or chemical, is in reality a brief description of relation between two moments. All qualities are relations in disguise. Analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.

45. The two components of all things, τὸ ἐν

and τὸ ἄπειρον, are thus Metaphysical Ultima discovered by analysis, and not agents in the mechanical, chemical, or so-called psychological sense.

46. Why did Plato use such barren terms as τὸ ἓν—The One, and τὰ ἅλλα—All the rest of it? Τὸ ἓν is the geometrical unit, and Geometry is the medium between Sense and Intellect. Aristotle's usual term for Mathematics, as Plato viewed them, is τὰ μεταξύ.

47. Previous to Plato, the notion The One had been so far developed :—

a. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion Moral Perfection, making Unity a predicate of Essence :

b. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence :

c. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity :

d. Zeno defended Unity by proving plurality impossible.

48. In Aristotle's hands the notion Unity became Substance, and in that shape was transmitted by the schoolmen to modern thought. It is obvious that the modern atom is a Lilliputian substance.

49. The One being positive, τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς is thrown off as its *contre-coup*, by the process which Hegel elaborated.

50. Anti-Platonists, from Aristotle to Jowett, ask—Where are the Ideas? Would a Kantian entertain the question—Where are the Categories, and Ideas, and Forms?

51. According to Hegel, evolution is Specification: according to Haeckel, specification is Evolution. That the road up is the road down must be seen in time.

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

THE philosophical portion of the Dialogue is divided into two parts: the first extends from 127d to 135; and the second from 135 to the end, 166. The first part deals with the question of the relation of the Ideas to sensible things; the second with the relation of the head-Idea—The One—to everything else. The first part discusses generally the relation between the supersensible and the sensible; the second elaborates the relations of the paramount metaphysical entity—The One—to all its subordinates, including sensible things. The second part is thus a particular application of the first; but, as The One is the paramount entity, its relations are all-pervading.

With regard to the first portion, we are told by Mr. Jowett that Plato has anticipated the criticism of all future ages on his Ideas. Mr. Grote declares that there are no dialogues in which the Parmenidean objections to the doctrine of Ideas are elucidated or even recited. But surely all the objections which are urged in the *Parmenides* are

based on an assumption with which the sound doctrine of Ideas has nothing to do.

(1). The Idea is spaceless and timeless. This disposes of the objections illustrated by the day and by the sail: 130e—b 1e, *par.* 6.

(2). The Idea must either admit of finiteness or proceed to infinity. This disposes of the objections urged in 132a b, and in 132d—133a, *pars.* 7 and 9.

(3). The Idea cannot depend for its cognition and existence on man. Its essence cannot be *concipi*: B. 2, b—d, *par.* 8. This to Plato would be a truism.

(4). The Idea cannot exist in total aloofness from man; for this would deprive man on the one hand of all objective knowledge, and God on the other of all knowledge of human knowledge. The obvious conclusions are, that we have a knowledge of the Idea, and that God has so too. These conclusions are quite in accordance with the other Dialogues. It is curious that what Mr. Jowett regards as the true theory of Ideas—that they exist only in the mind—is deliberately rejected by Plato in this Dialogue. If the paramount One does not exist, the result is Phenomenalism and Nihilism. In the same way, Mr. Green, in his introduction to Hume, shows that without Identity and Causation the sensualism of Hume and the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill are impossible, and with them untrue.

To moderns, the difficulty is to conceive that the Idea, while timeless and spaceless, is likewise objectively existing. That Plato held the Idea to

be timeless is evident from numberless passages, from the authoritative passage in the *Timæus*, and the express statement of Aristotle that Plato was the only philosopher who held Time to be the result of what we may call creation. The Idea is likewise *à fortiori* spaceless. Space, according to Plato, is the creature of an illicit process of reasoning, and it is not an object of the senses nor of natural belief. Its double function is to express the apparent but unreal identity of phenomena in a state of flux, and their dependence on the higher essence of the Idea. Aristotle's testimony is conclusive on the point. He asks why Plato does not locate the Idea in space.—*Phys.* iv. ii. 5.

If the Idea be not in time or in space, how does it exist? In the mind, says Mr. Jowett. In what mind? If mind means the human mind, *quâ* human, then we are reduced to individualism. I may infer, or I may not, that there may be some other being with a mind like mine, more or less. If we say in the Divine mind, or in the Universal mind, then the Idea will only be an accident of the higher consciousness. But if we mean by Idea, as Plato did—the Form which perfectly and completely dominates pure thought, and which dominates ours to a smaller extent—then it is true to say that the Idea is not only logically but substantially prior to thought and volition, Divine as well as human, and is therefore independent of both. Surely in a narrower sphere, where a man has consciously grasped the Law of Identity or the

Law of Contradiction, he sees at once that these Laws are something more than the facts of his own brain—something more than actual clearness or passing confusion. But, first, as human thought is dominated consciously or unconsciously by the Laws of thinking, so the Divine Thinking is dominated by the Ideas. To say that Ideas exist in the mind is much the same as saying that the Law of Gravity exists in a man's watch.

The relation of the Idea to sensible things, and of God to both, is somewhat as follows: The Idea consists of two elements, the One and the Indefinite. The Indefinite is pure Passivity. Neither of these elements is created. They are co-eternal with God. God is good. As Aristotle explains it, Goodness is the matter, and One, the form, of the highest Ens. God is also Cause, the notion which brings the One and Goodness into communion. Goodness works through Causality, according to the type set by the Idea of Good. Consequently, the Law which dominates Goodness in its Causal Energy is logically prior to that Energy. On what does the Summum Ens work? On the Indefinite, or the passive element in the Idea, the space, or rather place, of the *Timaeus*. The first causal act of Summum Ens imposes the Law of mere sequence on Passivity. The result is, a chaos of unpredictable sequences, a notion grasped by Milton. The second causal act of Summum Ens is to impose on Chaotic sequence predictable sequence or physical Law, and the result is, the Sensible World. The God of

Plato thus creates nothing, he organises Passivity. Aristotle's question, Why the Idea is not in space, if pressed home, comes to this: Why is the whole Idea, with all its Form and Matter, not in a small fractional result of its Matter misconceived, namely, Place? That Space is not an independent Entity can be proved by other considerations. The non-existence of a Vacuum inside the world is stated positively in the *Timaeus*, where its existence would seem necessary, in the case of one moving body displacing another. This phenomenon Plato explains by the hypothesis of circular motion, a motion which may be exemplified by moving a set of balls round the edge of a "solitaire" board. He has been charged with inconsistency in allowing the structural solids, the Tetrahedron, the Octahedron, and the Icosahedron, to combine in different proportions, all the while he denies the existence of Vacuum. He may easily be defended by the consideration that the complement of the interstices is furnished by τὸ ἀπειρον—the element of Passivity or Receptivity in the Idea.

What then is the Sensible Thing, the Sensible Idea of Locke and Berkeley? Relatively to us, it is strictly τὸ φαινόμενον, τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which is in course of presentation, and which, therefore, *ex vi termini*, is passing away. Objectively, it is the causal action of God, working through the Idea, on the senses. Logically, and chronologically, it is distinct from the Idea. In essence, it is the contrary of the Idea, as the one is ever abiding and

the other is momentary ; and finally, with regard to theories of perception, the sensible thing bears to its Idea—or rather congeries of Ideas—the relation only of a sign to the thing signified.

“Mind,” says Shelley, “cannot create, it can only perceive.” This is the popular view. It is the usual confounding of Brain and Thought. In the individual, Sensation precedes Thought ; Neurosis precedes Psychosis ; but Neurosis—Brain—presupposes Space, Time, and all the constituents of Intelligibility.

Everybody agrees that what is in consciousness may be safely dealt with. But the question arises : Is there anything outside consciousness ? In the language of the Dialogue, if τὸ ἐν is the formative element, what is τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ? In other words, What is τὸ ἄπειρον, which Aristotle represents as the second element in the Idea ? It is food for Form—τὸ πέραις. To alter Clifford’s term, it may be called Form-stuff. And this Form-stuff, at a certain stage of development, is the χώρα or space of the *Timaeus*—the only passage in Plato’s writings which Aristotle finds at variance with the official statements in Plato’s lectures.—*Phys.* iv. ii. 5.

To make Space an ultimum in the Platonic Genesis is as preposterous as to make Hegel a Hamiltonian because he allows *Richtigkeit* to the pabulum of the senses. Τὸ ἄπειρον is not outside consciousness. It is part of consciousness : it is there as τὸ ἄπειρον. The chemical metaphor has taken such hold, that when we talk of an element

of consciousness, we almost *eo ipso* assert that it is not to be found in the mature consciousness, except in a totally different shape. But, in Plato, the original aspect of the element reappears in the compound: τὸ ἄπειρον is τὸ ἄπειρον, and will not be anything else. Plato is thus a thorough-going Idealist: τὸ ἄπειρον is part of the domain of thought.

In applying the terms of modern speculation to Plato, it is not meant that he had before him modern problems in their present shape. But the best teaching of our time is the importance of history as a basis of criticism, and this teaching shatters the doctrine that we must read a philosopher by what went before and not by what comes after him.

Hegel allows *Richtigkeit*, but not *Wahrheit*, to the sensible element. Plato is more idealistic; for while in the *Phaedo* he combats the notion that the sensible element is delusive, in the *Republic* he argues that the same volume of raw material may and does admit of opposite relations.

The most striking passage in the Dialogue is where Parmenides rebukes Socrates for withholding ideas from mean objects. This is not really at variance with the passage in the *Timaeus*, 66 d-67 a. There he states that Smells are the result of air and water affecting the organs, and that they are distinguished merely as pleasant or the reverse. In the *Philebus*, Smells are not preceded by any craving, and so far are higher than the plea-

sures of repletion. In our day a great poet has written :—

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies ;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

This is genuine Idealism. What we call a single thing is the concourse of all relations—the complexus of all Ideas—all in all.

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ,
ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ,
ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ,
ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, } *Characters in the Introduction.*

ΠΥΘΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΖΗΝΩΝ,
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ,
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ. } *Characters in the Main Discussion.*

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

St. III.
p. 126.

Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικό-
μεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ
Γλαύκωνι· καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεί-
μαντος, χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἶ του δέει τῶν
τῆδε, ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, εἶπον
ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.
λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τῷ
b ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ
μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδή-
μησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος
ἔξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης
ὄνομα. πάνυ γε, ἔφη· αὐτῷ δέ γε Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ
τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει; οἷδ', εἶπον ἐγώ, πολῖταί μοι
εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ
Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ πολλὰ
c ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις
ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει. ἀληθῆ,
ἔφη, λέγεις. τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα δια-
κούσαι. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὧν
αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν
πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ
διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι

Introduc-
tion.

1. Cepha-
lus relates
his intro-
duction to
Antipho.

γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεί δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Με-
λίτῃ. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν p. 127.
τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεί ἐκδιδόντα
σκενάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἷ τε ἀδελ-
φοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὧν ἔνεκα παρέϊμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ
με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἠσπάζετο,
καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ὤκνει· πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἔπειτα
μέντοι διηγείτο.

2. Antipho
relates, on
the autho-
rity of Py-
thodorus, a
conversa-
tion be-
tween
Socrates,
Zeno, and
Parme-
nides; the
particulars
of the
meeting:
Zeno is
reading
aloud his
treatise on
Existence.

ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον
ὅτι ἀφίκοιτό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα b
Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενί-
δην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολὺν,
καλὸν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα
πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τεττα-
ράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν·
καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγο-
νέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ
ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμειῳ· οἱ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι c
τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ
πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος
γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων
κομισθῆναι· Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον.
ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν
δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνν
βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων,
ἡνίκα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος d
ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀρισ-
τοτελεῖ τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ'
ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός
γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέαι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι
 τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι,
 καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο
 λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ
 ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον
 οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια οὔτε τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια
 οἶόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν
 Ζήνωνα. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοια
 εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
 εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα;
 ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστίν ὃ βούλουταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ
 ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι ^{καὶ ἀναγνῶναι} παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα,
 ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστὶ; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶε σοι
 τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ
 ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσους περ
 128 λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις,
 ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἀλλά, φάναι
 τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ
 βούλεται. μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρ-
 μενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὄδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου
 φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὑπεικῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγ-
 γράμματι. ταῦτόν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ
 σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς
 ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν
 b ἐν φῆσι εἶναι Τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει
 καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὄδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι,
 τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέ-
 χεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά,
 καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
 εἰρηκῆναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ
 ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα

First part
 of the
 dialogue:
 prelimi-
 nary dis-
 cussion,
 the relation
 of τὰ Εἶδη
 to sensible
 things.

3. Socrates
 criticizes
 Zeno, and
 wishes to
 know if he
 is right in
 the view he
 takes.
 Zeno says
 he is.
 "Then
 you,
 Zeno,"
 says So-
 crates,
 "agree
 with Par-
 menides,
 but you put
 your views
 in the
 negative
 form, that
 Existence
 is non-
 plural,
 while Par-
 menides
 puts his in
 the affir-
 mative,
 that Exis-
 tence is
 one." Zeno
 explains
 that his
 thesis is a
*reductio ad
 absurdum*
 of the an-
 tagonistic
 thesis, i. e.
 greater ab-
 surdities
 follow
 from sup-
 posing
 Existence

above me

over my heads?

plural than
from sup-
posing
Existence
one.

εἰρήσθαι. ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἤσθησαι· καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναί ο σκύλακες εἶ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἄπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθῆναι γραφήναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖν, ὡς εἶ ἔν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοϊότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίει. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξέγενετο, εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μή. ταύτη γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπέικασας.

4. Socrates sets forth his theory of Generalization, that the things denoted by general words may participate in opposite

ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἶπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδός τι Ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν Ἄνόμοιον· τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν ; 129

καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς Ὀμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια εἶδη, but
 γίνεσθαι ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν εἶδη them-
 μεταλαμβάνη, τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, selves can-
 τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα not admit
 ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι of incom-
 b τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ patible
 αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά affections :
 τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια e. g. a man
 ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέ is one, and
 χοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, so partici-
 οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδέ pates in
 γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ Unity: but
 Ἐνός καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ Πλήθους αὐ also one of
 μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἔστιν Ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ many, in
 c ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ Πολλὰ δὴ ἔν, τοῦτο ἦδη which case
 θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύ he partici-
 τως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐ pates in
 τοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, Plurality:
 ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα but the
 καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βού εἶδος Unity
 ληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ can never
 δεξιά μου ἔστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ be the εἶδος
 ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὀπισθεν, καὶ Plurality,
 ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· Πλήθους γάρ, οἶμαι, nor vice
 d μετέχω· ὅταν δὲ ἔν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπτά ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς versa.
 ἐγὼ εἶμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ Ἐνός· ὥστε
 ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. εἰάν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα
 ἐπιχειρῆ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους
 καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ
 καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ οὐδέ τὰ
 Πολλὰ ἔν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστόν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ

ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἔαν δέ τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ
 ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ
 καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οἷον Ὅμοιότητά τε καὶ Ἄνο-
 μοιότητα καὶ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ Ἐν καὶ Στάσις e
 καὶ Κίνησις καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτα ἐν
 ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα ^{οὐκ ἐπι}δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ δια-
 κρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ^{οὐκ ἐπι} ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη,
 θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν
 πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν
 ὦδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παν-
 τοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις 130
 διήλθετε, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς (λογισμῶ) λαμβανο-
 μένοις ἐπιδείξαι.

5. Socrates
 denies the
 univer-
 sality of
 εἶδη. He
 allows that
 there are
 εἶδη of
 Beauty,
 Goodness,
 and such
 like; he is
 doubtful
 about the
 existence
 of εἶδη for
 such things
 as Man,
 Fire, and
 Water;
 and he is
 quite posi-
 tive that
 there are
 no εἶδη for
 such things
 as Hair,
 Mud,
 Filth. Par-
 menides
 replies that
 this is a

λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους
 ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι
 τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ
 τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλή-
 λους βλέποντας μειδιᾷ ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη.
 ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσάμενου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρ-
 μενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιός ἐστι ἀγασθαι
 τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς b
 σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ
 ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτῷ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί
 σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῇ Ὅμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς
 ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ Ἐν δὴ καὶ Πολλὰ καὶ πάντα
 ὅσα νῦν δὴ Ζήωνος ἤκουες; ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν
 Σωκράτη. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην,
 οἷον Δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ Καλοῦ
 καὶ Ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν τοιούτων; ναί,
 φάναι. τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν c

οἰοὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος Ἀνθρώπου ἢ Πυρὸς ἢ καὶ Ὕδατος; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολ-
λάκις δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα
χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. ἢ καὶ
περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν
εἶναι, οἷον Θριξὶ καὶ Πηλὸς καὶ Ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο ὅ
τι ἀτιμώτατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς, ὃν
d ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ
μῆ; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
μέν γε, ἅπερ ὀρώμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ
τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μῆ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη
μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μῆ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων
ταυτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι,
δείσας μῆ ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπροσθῶν
διαφθαρῶ· ἐκέισε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ
ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος
e διατρίβω. νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην,
ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία,
ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν
αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπο-
βλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

τόδε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι
εἶδη ἅττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς
131 ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον Ὁμοιότητος μὲν μετα-
λαβόντα ὅμοια, Μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, Κάλλους τε
καὶ Δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίνεσθαι.
πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι ὄλου
τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἐκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνου
μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς
τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἄν; εἶπεν. πότερον οὖν
6. Parmenides discusses the rationale of Participation: he shows that particular things cannot participate with the εἶδη by any mode of Extension, either by way of

whole or
by way of
part, either
simul-
taneously
or succes-
sively, i. e.
the εἶδος
is both
spaceless
and time-
less.

δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν
πολλῶν ἐν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν
Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐνεῖναι; ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ b
ταῦτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται,
καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἶη. οὐκ ἂν, εἴ
γε, φάναι, οἶον ἢ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ οὔσα
πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῇ
αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν
ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταῦτὸν εἶη. ἠδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῦτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον
εἰ ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης
ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἠγεῖ c
λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι. ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ
ιστίον εἶη ἂν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;
μέρος. μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν
αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν
μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος
ἐκάστου ἂν εἶη. φαίνεται οὕτω γε. ἢ οὖν ἐθελή-
σεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ Ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς,
εἰπέιν. ὄρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγεθος μεριεῖς
καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει d
σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα
οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται; πάνυ γ', ἔφη. τί δέ; τοῦ
Ἰσοῦ μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ὦ
ἐλάττωνι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσοῦ τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ
ἔσται; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ τοῦ Σμικροῦ μέρος τις
ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον
ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ
τὸ Σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται· ὦ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαι-
ρεθέν, τούτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ μείζον ἢ e

πρίν. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε. τί' οὖν
 τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ
 ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ
 ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,
 φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον
 οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

132 τί δὲ δὴ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποῖον; οἶμαί
 σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε, ^{from some kind, as at the follow.} ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι.
 ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι, μία τις
 ἴσως δοκεῖ ιδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ιδόντι,
 ὅθεν ἐν τὸ Μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.
 τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα, εἰάν
 ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐ
 που μέγα φανεῖται, ὧ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα
 φαίνεσθαι; ἔοικεν. ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀνα
 φανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ Μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ
 τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν
 b ἕτερον, ὧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι
 δὴ ἐν ἑκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα
 τὸ πλήθος.

ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, ^{scilicet} μὴ
 τῶν εἰδῶν ἑκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμῶ
 αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς.
 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐν γε ἑκαστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
 πάσχοι ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν
 ἑκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;
 ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ἀλλὰ τινός; ναί. ὄντος ἢ
 c οὐκ ὄντος; ὄντος. οὐχ' ἐνός τινος, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν
 ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, ^{scilicet} μίαν τινὰ οὔσαν ἰδέαν;
 ναί. εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο (τὸ νοούμενον ἐν
 εἶναι, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ

7. The origin of the theory of the unique εἶδος: if the εἶδος be absolutely distinct from the sum of particulars, εἶδος in quantity is infinite, which is an absurdity; it is therefore unique.

8. The εἶδος perhaps may be an intellectual Concept which exists only in the mind of the percipient: but this hypothesis eventuates in a dilemma, and either alternative is an absurdity.

φαίνεται. τί δὲ δὴ; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.

9. εἶδη may perhaps exist objectively as Types to which sensible things conform: but this hypothesis would involve an infinite series of mediating εἶδη, which is absurd: for the εἶδος is unique.

ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα δ ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἢ μέθεξις αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικε τῷ εἶδει, οἶόν τε ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη. οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ οἶοια μετέχοντα ὁμοια ἦ, οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὅμοιον ἦ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ 133 οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἔαν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίνηται. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ὧ μεταλαμβάνει. ἔοικεν. ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἢ ἀπορία, ἔάν τις εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα.

10. If the εἶδη exist absolutely, we cannot know

εἰ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις. πῶς

δῆ; εἰπεῖν. πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον
 δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίῃ μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γί-
 νώσκεισθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ
 εἶδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξα-
 σθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπειρος
 ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφνῆς, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ
 πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικ-
 e νυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἶη ὁ ἄγνωστα
 ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. πῆ δῆ, ὦ Παρμενίδη;
 φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν
 καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν
 ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶ-
 τον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν
 αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἶη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
 καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν
 πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἷ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς
 d τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
 εἶτε ὁμοιώματα εἶτε ὄπη δῆ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὦν
 ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ
 δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις, αὐτὰ
 αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη, καὶ
 ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.
 πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οἶον, φάναι τὸν
 Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δούλος
 ἔστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ Δεσπότην δῆ που, ὃ ἔστι Δεσπό-
 e τῆς, ἐκείνου δούλος ἔστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ Δούλου, ὃ ἔστι
 Δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἄν-
 θρώπου ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτά ἐστιν· αὐτὴ δὲ Δεσποτεία
 αὐτῆς Δουλείας ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως,
 αὐτὴ Δουλεία αὐτῆς Δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν
 ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα

them, since
 an absolute
 object im-
 plies as its
 correlative
 a faculty of
 absolute
 know-
 ledge; and,
 conversely,
 Deity, as
 possessing
 absolute
 knowledge,
 could not
 have less
 than abso-
 lute know-
 ledge, that
 is, could
 not have
 our know-
 ledge, and
 therefore
 would be
 without
 some
 knowledge,
 which is
 absurd.

πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς
 αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως 134
 πρὸς ἑαυτά· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; Πάνυ γ',
 εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπισ-
 τήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν Ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ
 ἔστιν Ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;
 πάνυ γε. ἐκάστη δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν,
 ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ
 οὐ; ναί. ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ'
 ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν
 ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπισ- b
 τήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά
 γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ'
 ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. γιγνώσκεται δέ
 γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς Ἐπιστήμης
 αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα; ναί. ὃ γε ἡμεῖς
 οὐκ ἔχομεν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγ-
 νώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης
 οὐ μετέχομεν. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν
 ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ Ἀγαθὸν c
 καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνο-
 μεν. κινδυνεύει. ὄρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον
 τόδε. τὸ ποῖον; φαίης ἂν ἢ οὐ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό
 τι γένος Ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι
 ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ Κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα
 πάντα οὕτως; ναί. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς
 Ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν
 φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; ἀνάγκη.
 ἄρ' οὖν οἷός τε αὐτὸ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν d
 γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν Ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τί γὰρ οὐ;
 ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώ-

κρατες, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
 τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
 πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα. ὁμο-
 λόγηται γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν
 ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη Δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη
 Ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἢ Δεσποτεία ἢ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν
 e ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἢ Ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς
 γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως
 ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ
 οὐδὲ γινώσκουμεν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρα
 ἐπιστήμη, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
 οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γινώσκουσι τὰ
 ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν,
 ἔφη, θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος ἦ, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀπο-
 στερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναί.

ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης,
 135 καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον
 ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων
 καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπο-
 ρεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε
 ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴτε ὃ τι μάλιστα εἶη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
 αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ
 ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τι λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι
 ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι· καὶ
 341 ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν
 ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῇ καθ'
 b αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ
 ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἰκανῶς
 διευκρινησάμενον. συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρ-
 μενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν
 λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ

11. With-
 out εἶδη,
 there can
 be no phi-
 losophy.

τις δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ^{admit} αὐτὴ μὴ ^{admit} ἑάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἑὼν ιδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

12. Parmenides expounds the Method of philosophizing: every hypothesis should be argued affirmatively, *i. e.* supposing it to be true, and negatively, *i. e.* supposing it to be not true, and the consequences negative and positive should be compared. Socrates, continues Parmenides, had rightly conceived that the difficulties arising from Incompatibilities lay in the region of εἶδη, and not in the region of

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποῖ τρέφει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι. πρῶ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς Καλόν τε τί καὶ Δίκαιον καὶ Ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶν σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εἰ ἴσθι, ἡ ὀρμή, ἣν ὀρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἰπεῖν, ὄνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγήσασθαι εἶναι. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 136

ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι. οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἐν καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς Πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αἰθις αὖ ἔαν ὑποθῆ, εἰ ἔστιν Ὀμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἔφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ οὗτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ τι ἂν προέλη, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τᾶλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι ἂν προαιρῆ αἰεὶ, ἔαν τε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῆ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο, ἔαν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματεῖαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε. ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν; καὶ τὸν Ζήνονα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον

sensible things. Parmenides exemplifies his method by supposing Zeno's thesis εἰ πολλά ἐστι applied to τὸ ἐν and to τὰ πολλά, and the counter thesis εἰ μὴ ἐστι πολλά applied to τὸ ἐν and τὰ πολλά, both by themselves and in combination.

ἢ ὁ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὄρας ὅσον ἔργον προστάτεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

13. Parmenides consents to argue the question, as to the existence of Unity, affirmatively and negatively: he takes Aristotle, afterwards one of the Thirty, as his assistant.

ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάσαι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὁ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην, ἀνάγκη, φάσαι, πείθεσθαι. καὶ τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, 137 ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῆ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι· καγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλήθος λόγων· ὅμως δέ—δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίξειν, ἀπ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἀρξώμαι καὶ τῆς ἑμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἓν ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ ἓν, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν; πάνν μὲν οὖν, φάσαι τὸν Ζήνονα. τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοι ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἦκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοί, καὶ ἂ οἶεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἄμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαντ' ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπό-

c κρισις. ἔτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων· ἀλλ' ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.

Εἶεν δὴ, φάναι· εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, (1) ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἶη πολλὰ Τὸ ἓν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν; (2) οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι. τί δὴ; τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἔστιν. ναί. τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐδ' ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ, ὅλον ἂν εἶη; πάνυ γε. ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα Τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον τε ὄν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. ἀνάγκη. ἀμφο-
 d τέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως Τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν. ἀληθῆ. δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δεῖ. οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται Τὸ ἓν. οὐ γάρ. (3) οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὐτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶη. ὀρθῶς. (4) καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρασ ἐκάστου. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἄπειρον ἄρα Τὸ ἓν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει. ἄπειρον. (5) καὶ
 e ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχοι. πῶς; στρογγύλου γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχη. ναί. καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἔσχατοι ἐπίπροσθεν ᾗ. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι Τὸ ἓν καὶ πόλλ' ἂν εἶη, εἴτ' εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν,
 138 ἐπεὶπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει. ὀρθῶς. (6) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦ-
 τόν γε ὄν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἶη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη. πῶς δὴ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὄν κύκλω που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ

14. Second part of the dialogue: the relation of Τὸ ἓν and Τέλλα.

A. The affirmative, if the One exist; and B. The negative, if the One do not exist.

(A). The affirmative argument: (1.) The First Hypothesis: εἰ Τὸ ἓν ἔστιν ἓν, if the One be One unconditioned, the One admits of no predicate whatsoever, either (1) Plurality; (2) Part; (3) Whole; (4) Beginning, Middle, End; and is therefore ἄπειρον; (5) has no Figure, either curvilinear or rectilinear; (6) is not localized either relatively to itself or to anything else;

πολλαχού ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κυκλω ἄπτεσθαι. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ ἑαυτὸ εἶη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἶπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη· ἐν τῷ γάρ ^b τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἶη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταῦτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο. οὐ γὰρ οἶν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ που Τὸ Ἐν, μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν. οὐκ ἔστιν. (7) ὅρα δὴ, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶν ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἢ φέροιο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν· αὐται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. ναί. ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ ^c Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι. ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοιώσιν γε κινεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται. ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἴσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιο τὸ ἔν, ἤτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιο κύκλω ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἐτέραν ἐξ ἐτέρας. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν κύκλω μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε ^d μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλω ποτὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμειβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται; εἶπερ γε δὴ. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί. ἄρ' οἶν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ. εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πῶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασι, εἶπερ δὴ

(7) has no stationary state, has no motion-ary state—either by way of—(α) ἀλλοίωσις, modification, or (β) τὸ φέρεσθαι, motion, either circular, or progressive, or qualitative;

ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται
 e τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὐδὲ μέρη εἶη· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἶη
 ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τε που ἔσται
 τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε
 ἔξω. ἀληθῆ. οὐδὲ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ' ὅλον
 τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι
 που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;
 139 φαίνεται. οὐτ' ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ γιγνόμενον
 χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον,
 οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον. οὐκ ἔοικεν. κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
 κίνησιν Τὸ Ἐν ἀκίνητον. ἀκίνητον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
 εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. φαμεν γάρ.
 οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. τί δὴ; ὅτι ἤδη ἂν
 ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶη ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
 ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ
 ἐνεῖναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐν
 b ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν οὔθ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἔστηκεν.
 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ'
 ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. οὐκ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται γέ. (8) has no
 Identity, therefore
 no Diversity; no
 Similarity, therefore
 no Dis-
 similarity;
 (8) οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτόν γε οὔθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ
 ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου
 ἂν εἶη. τί δὴ; ἕτερον μὲν που ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνὸς
 ἕτερον ἂν εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἐν. ἀληθῆ. καὶ
 μὴν ταυτόν γε ἐτέρῳ ὄν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἶη, αὐτὸ
 c δ' οὐκ ἂν εἶη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἶη ὅπερ
 ἔστιν, ἐν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ταυτόν
 μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται. οὐ
 γάρ. ἕτερον δὲ γε ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ἦ
 ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. ὀρθῶς. τῷ μὲν
 ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἶε; οὐ δῆτα. d
 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ
 μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἕτερον
 οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον. ὀρθῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτόν
 ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. πῶς δ' οὐ; οὐχ ἥπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
 φύσις, αὕτη δῆπου καὶ Τοῦ Ταύτου. τί δῆ; ὅτι
 οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτόν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται.
 ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; Τοῖς Πολλοῖς ταῦτόν γενόμενον πολλὰ
 ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔν. ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' εἰ
 Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ταῦτόν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι
 ταῦτόν ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅποτε ἔν,
 ταῦτόν. πάνυ γε. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν e
 ἔσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτως ἐν ὄν οὐχ
 ἐν ἔσται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον
 ἄρα καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ ἢ ἐτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ
 ταῦτόν. ἀδύνατον. οὕτω δὲ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτόν
 Τὸ Ἐν οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ εἶη. οὐ γὰρ
 οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίον τι εἶναι οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον
 οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ. τί δῆ; ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που
 πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ναί. Τοῦ δέ γε Ἐνὸς χωρὶς
 ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν Τὸ Ταῦτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἀλλὰ 140
 μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, πλείω
 ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἐν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί.
 οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν
 οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὁμοιον
 ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ
 ἔοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν·
 καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἐν. πλείω
 γάρ. τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου
 ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἶη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτόν b

πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ὀρθῶς. Τὸ δέ γε Ἐν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἑτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὐθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἶη Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. (9) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄρισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. πῆ; ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾗ. ναί. μείζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὂν, οἷς

c μὲν ἂν ζύμμετρον ᾗ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὀντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνατον. ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἶη, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὂν. οὐκουν φαίνεται γέ. ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γέ μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων,

d ὄσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσοῦτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἶη· καὶ οὕτως αὐ οὐκέτι ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὄσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἶη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἐφάνη γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὐδ' αὖ μείζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὐθ' ἑτέρου. παντάπασι μὲν

e οὖν οὕτως. (10) τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν Τὸ Ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι Τῷ

(9) no mode of Quantity, either Equality, or Inequality, or Excess; therefore no Defect;

(10) no mode of Time;

Ἐνί, οὐθ' ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ
 οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιοτήτός τε καὶ ἀνισότη-
 τος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνν μὲν οὖν. 141
 πῶς οὖν οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτε-
 ρον εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον οὖν ;
 οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἶη νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτε-
 ρον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ
 οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ
 παράπαν δύναται ἂν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἶη ;
 ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν τι ἦ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
 πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι ; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε
 πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον ; τί μὴν ;
 τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτε- b
 ρον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. πῶς λέγεις ; ὧδε· διά-
 φορον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος
 διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ
 δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν,
 τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε
 εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ
 εἶναι. ἀνάγκη γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον c
 διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἐστὶ
 γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνά-
 γκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι. ἔοικεν.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι χρόνον
 μήτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίνεσθαι
 ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.
 ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιού- d
 του, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν
 ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβυτέρον τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον

- γίγνεσθαι. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν Τῷ γε Ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν. οὐ γὰρ μετῆν. οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τιι χρόνω. οὐκουν δὴ, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. (11) τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; καὶ μάλα. τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος; ναί. τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονει οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτ' ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἄν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἔν εἶναι· εἷη γὰρ ἄν ἤδη ὄν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε ἔν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῶδε λόγῳ πιστεῦειν. κινδυνεύει. (12) ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἷη ἄν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει; οὐκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
- b βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἰάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῆ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι. οὐκουν ἔν εἰ ἔστι,

(11) no Production, nor Existence;

(12) no logical accident either of Name or Definition; and no psychological correlative, either as Notion, Perception, or Conception. This conclusion is rejected.

The mean-
ing of the
Second
Hypo-
thesis.

φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε
τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτως;
ναί. ὄρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἶόν τε
αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; οὐχ οἶόν
τε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἶη ἄν, οὐ ταῦτόν
οἶσα Τῷ Ἐνί; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία,
οὐδ' ἂν ἐκείνο Τὸ Ἐν ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον
ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ
αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ ξυμβαί-
νειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν;
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει Τὸ
Ἐν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλ-
λήβδην εἶπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν; πάνυ γε.

II. *The
Second Hy-
pothesis:*
ἐν εἰ ἔστι
= εἰ τὸ Ἐν
ἐστὶν ὄν
= εἰ τὸ Ἐν
οὐσίας με-
τέχει, τὸ
Ἐν admits
all con-
trary pre-
dicates.

(1) If the
One exist,
that is, par-
ticipate in
existence,
then the
One is in-
finite in
quantity.

Πάλιν (1) δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί συμβήσεται.
σκοπεῖ οὖν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
τοιούτου ὄν Τὸ Ἐν σημαίνειν, οἶον μέρη ἔχειν;
πῶς; ὦδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ
Τὸ Ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ Η τε
Οὐσία καὶ Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐ ὑπεθέ-
μεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὄλον
ἐν ὄν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια Τό τε
Ἐν καὶ Τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον
τῶν μορίων τούτων μόνον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ
τοῦ ὄλου μόνιον τό γε μόνιον προσρητέον; τοῦ
ὄλου. καὶ ὄλον ἄρα ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόνιον
ἔχει. πάνυ γε. τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον
τούτων τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα
ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ εἶναι μόνιον ἢ Τὸ Ὄν
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μορίον; οὐκ ἂν εἶη. πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν
μορίων ἐκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ

γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὐ μορίοις τὸ
 μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεὶ, ὃ τί
 περ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὸ μόριον αἰεὶ ἴσχει·
 Τό τε γὰρ Ἐν τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ Ἐν·
 143 ὥστε ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἔν
 εἶναι. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ
 πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ Ἐν ὄν εἴη; ἔοικεν. (2) ἴθι δὴ (2) If the
 One partici-
 cipate in
 Existence,
 Number
 must exist.
 καὶ τῆδε ἔτι. πῆ; οὐσίας φαμέν μετέχειν τὸ Ἐν,
 διὸ ἔστιν; ναί. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ Ἐν ὄν πολλὰ
 ἐφάνη. οὕτως. τί δέ; αὐτὸ τὸ Ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμέν
 οὐσίας μετέχειν, εἰάν αὐτὸ τῆ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ'
 αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμέν μετέχειν, ἄρα
 γε ἔν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτο;
 b ἔν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἴδωμεν δὴ ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν
 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό;
 εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ Ἐν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔν οὐσίας μετέσχειν.
 ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν Ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ
 τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε τῶ ἔν τὸ Ἐν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε
 τῶ οὐσία εἶναι Ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῶ
 Ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ Ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. πάνν μὲν
 οὖν. ὥστε οὐ ταυτόν ἔστιν οὔτε τῶ Ἐνὶ οὔτε τῆ
 οὐσία τὸ Ἐτερον. πῶς γάρ; τί οὖν; εἰάν προελώ-
 c μεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ Ἐτερον
 εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ Ἐν εἴτε τὸ Ἐν καὶ τὸ
 Ἐτερον, ἄρ' οὐκ ἔν ἐκάστη τῆ προαιρέσει προαιρού-
 μεθά τινα ὡ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; πῶς;
 ὦδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν. καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν
 ἔν; καὶ τούτο. ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν
 εἴρηται; ναί. τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἔν,
 ἄρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω; πάνν γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰάν
 οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἔν, καὶ οὕτω

πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄμφω λέγω; ναί. ὦ δ' ἂν d
 ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἄρα οἶόν τε ἄμφω
 μὲν αὐτὰ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μῆ; οὐχ οἶόν τε. ὦ δ' ἂν
 δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν
 ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία. τούτων ἄρα ἐπέπερ σύνδνο
 ἕκαστα ξυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἂν εἷη ἕκαστον.
 φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί, συντε-
 θέντος ἐνὸς ὁποιοῦν ἡτιμιῶν συζυγία οὐ τρία
 γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί. τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ
 δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ e
 ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς
 ἐν; ἀνάγκη. δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δῖς οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ
 τρία τρίς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων
 καὶ δῖς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρίς ὄντων, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη τε τρία δῖς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; πολλή γε.
 ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἄρτιάκῖς ἂν εἷη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκῖς
 καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκῖς καὶ περιττὰ ἄρτιάκῖς. ἔστιν 144
 οὕτως. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἶε τινὰ ἀριθμὸν
 ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς
 γε. εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.
 ἀνάγκη. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πόλλ' ἂν
 εἷη καὶ πλήθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος
 ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; καὶ
 πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει,
 καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν
 αὐτῆς; ναί. ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα Ἡ Οὐσία b
 νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε
 τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν
 καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν

(3) If
 Number
 participate
 in Exist-
 ence,
 Existence
 is distribu-
 table to
 Infinity.

ὄντων του ἀποστατοῦ; οὐδαμῶς. κατακεκερμάτισ-
 ται ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ
 πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα,
 c καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα Τῆς Οὐσίας. ἔχει οὕτως.
 πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. πλείστα μέντοι.
 (4) τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν, ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος Τῆς
 Οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τοιοῦτο γέ-
 νοιτο; ἀλλ' εἶπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ,
 ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦ, ἔν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.
 ἀνάγκη. πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστῳ τῷ Τῆς Οὐσίας
 μέρει πρόσσεστι Τὸ Ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμι-
 κροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.
 d οὕτως. ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὄν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί;
 τοῦτο ἄθρει. ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὀρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον. με-
 μερισμένον ἄρα, εἶπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐ-
 δαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρεσι παρέσ-
 ται, ἢ μεμερισμένον. ναί. καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν
 πολλῇ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη. ἀνάγκη.
 οὐκ ἄρ' ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα
 μέρη Ἡ Οὐσία νενεμημένη εἶη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω
 e Τοῦ Ἐνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ Ἐνί
 οὔτε γὰρ Τὸ ὄν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε Τὸ
 Ἐν Τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισούσθον δύ' ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ
 πάντα. παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ'
 αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ Τῆς Οὐσίας πολλά τε
 καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλήθός ἐστιν. φαίνεται. οὐ μόνον
 ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημένον πολλά ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
 παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. (5) καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ
 μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένοι ἂν εἶη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον
 Τὸ Ἐν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;

(4) If Existence be distributable to Infinity, the One must be distributable likewise.

(5) The One must exhibit Rest and Motion.

ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη. 145
 πῶς δ' οὐ; Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ὄν ἐν τέ ἐστί που καὶ
 πολλά, καὶ ὄλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ
 ἄπειρον πλήθει. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπέιπερ
 πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη. τί δ';
 ὄλον ὄν οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν;
 ἢ οἶόν τέ τι ὄλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; καὶν του
 ἐν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὄλον εἶναι;
 οὐκ ἐθελήσει. καὶ ἀρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τελευτήν
 καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν Τὸ Ἐν. ἔχοι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ^b
 μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως
 μέσον εἴη. οὐ γάρ. καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς
 ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὄν μετέχοι ἂν Τὸ Ἐν, ἦτοι εὐθέως
 ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. μετέχοι
 γὰρ ἂν. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς; τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον
 ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ ἐστί καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὄλου. οὕτως.
 πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄλου περιέχεται; ναί.
 καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν ἐστί, ^c
 καὶ οὔτε τι πλεόν οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα. οὐ γάρ.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄλον Τὸ Ἐν ἐστί; πῶς δ' οὐ; εἰ
 ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὄλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἐστί δὲ
 τά τε πάντα Τὸ Ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ὀλον, περιέχεται
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἂν
 περιέχοιτο Τὸ Ἐν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὄλον
 αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστί, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε
 ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν ^d
 τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μῇ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε
 ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων
 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὄλον ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς

πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν
 μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶη, τὸ πλεον
 ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττοι εἶη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνα-
 του γάρ. μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν πλείοσι μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ' ἐν
 ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ
 c τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν
 μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὄν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ
 οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; πάνυ
 γε. ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ Ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ
 τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ
 οὕτω τὸ Ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν
 ἐτέρῳ. ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ Ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι; πῆ; ἔστηκε μὲν
 που, εἵπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν καὶ
 146 ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἶη, ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ. ἔστι γάρ. τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν
 ἐστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. τί δέ;
 τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ αἰεὶ ὄν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὄν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ
 ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; οὕτως. ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα τὸ Ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ,
 αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι. φαίνεται. (β) καὶ
 μὴν ταυτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον
 b ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτόν τε καὶ
 ἕτερον εἶναι, εἵπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν. πῶς;
 πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει· ἢ ταυτόν ἐστὶν ἢ
 ἕτερον· ἢ εἰ μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν
 εἶη τούτου, πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος
 ὅλον ἂν εἶη. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
 μέρος ἐστίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος
 αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἶη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. οὐ

(6) The One must exhibit Identity and Diversity with regard to—
 (α) itself, and (β) Τάλλα, everything else besides Τὸ Ἐν.

γὰρ οἶόν τε. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς Τὸ Ἔν; οὐ δῆτα. οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἶη. οὐ μέντοι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταῦτόν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη. τί δέ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι δὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὕτω μὲν ἐφάνη ἔχον Τὸ Ἔν, αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἔν. ἔοικεν. τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἐτέρου δ ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἔν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα Τοῦ Ἐνός, καὶ Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἔν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἶη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων. ἕτερον. ὄρα δὴ αὐτό τε Ταῦτόν καὶ Τὸ ἕτερον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἢ οὖν ἐβλήσει Ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ Ἐτέρῳ ἢ Τὸ ἕτερον ἐν Ταῦτῷ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐβλήσει. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ ἕτερον ἐν Ταῦτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ Τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γὰρ ὄντινόν εἶη ἔν τῳ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν Ταῦτῷ εἶη Τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἶη Τὸ ἕτερον. ἀληθῆ. οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔν οὔτε ἐν τῷ Ἐνὶ ἐνείη ἂν Τὸ ἕτερον. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ Ἐτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἶη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἔν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἔν Τοῦ Ἐνός ἕτερα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὲν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ' ἂν εἶη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα Τοῦ Ἐτέρου. πῶς γάρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς 147 ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ Ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Τοῦ Ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἔν ἦν, ἀλλά πη ἂν ἔν ἦν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἶη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἔν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἔν Τοῦ Ἐνός ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετείχε Τοῦ Ἐνός τὰ μὴ ἔν; μετείχεν.

b εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἔν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, οὐτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἔν Τὸ Ἐν εἶη οὐθ' ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὐτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἔν Τοῦ Ἐνός μόρια, οὐθ' ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ Τῷ Ἐνί. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήθ' ὅλα μήθ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἔφαμεν γάρ. φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἔν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε

c Τῶν Ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Τοῖς Ἄλλοις; ἴσως. ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ Τᾶλλα που ἕτερ' ἂν ἐκείνου εἶη. τί μὴν; οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ Τᾶλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὐτε μᾶλλον οὐθ' ἦττον; τί γὰρ ἂν; εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήθ' ἦττον, ὁμοίως. ναί. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθε Τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ Τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταῦτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα

d εἶεν Τό τε Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις καὶ Τᾶλλα Τῷ Ἐνί. πῶς λέγεις; ᾧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκεις ἢ ἅπαξ; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν ἔαν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκείνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ ἐστι τοῦ νομα, ἔαν δὲ πολλάκεις, οὐκ ἐκείνο; ἢ ἔαν τε ἅπαξ ἔαν τε πολλάκεις τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα φθέγγῃ, πολλή

ἀνάγκη σε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ λέγειν αἰεὶ; τί μὴν; οὐκοῦν
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι; πάνυ γε. ὅταν
ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, εἴαν τε ἅπαξ εἴαν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ
ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ἦν
ὄνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν
Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἕτερον δὲ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων, δις
τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἀλλ'
ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ αἰεὶ λέγομεν, ἢ σπερ ἦν
τοῦνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων
Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον 148
πεπονθέναί οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἶη
Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις· τὸ δὲ πού ταυτὸν πεπονθὸς
ὅμοιον· οὐχί; ναί. ἦ δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων
πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον
ἂν εἶη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἔοικεν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον. ναί.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις
ταυτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. τούναντίον δὲ γε πάθος ἐστὶ b
τὸ εἶναι ταῦτὸ Τοῖς Ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι Τῶν
Ἄλλων. πάνυ γε. ἦ γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.
ναί. ἦ ἄρα ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τούναν-
τίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δὲ πού τὸ
ἕτερον; ναί. ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα ταυτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναν-
τίον ἔσται τῷ ἐτέρῳ. ἔοικεν. ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ
ἀνόμοιον ἔσται Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις, ἦ μὲν ἕτερον, c
ὅμοιον, ἦ δὲ ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ,
ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.
τίνα; ἦ ταυτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναί, μὴ
ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ
ὅμοιον εἶναι· ἦ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ

ὄν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ὄν
 Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφό-
 τερα καὶ καθ' ἑκάτερον, ὁμοίον τε ἂν εἴη καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ
 ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ περ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἑαυτῷ
 ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἑκάτερον ὁμοίον τε καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ἀνάγκη. (7) τί δὲ δῆ; περὶ (7) The
 τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι Τὸ Ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ One must
 τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρι, πῶς ἔχει; σκόπει. σκοπῶ. with itself
 αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄλω Τὸ Ἐν ἐφάνη ὄν. ἦ and with
 ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις τὸ ἔν; ναί. ἦ everything
 μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις, τῶν Ἄλλων ἄπτοιτ' ἂν. ἦ the One
 δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν Ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο out of com-
 ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτ' ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν. munion
 φαίνεται. οὕτω μὲν δῆ ἄπτοιτ' ἂν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτοῦ τε with itself
 καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. ἄπτοιτο. τί δὲ τῆδε; ἄρ' οὐ πάν and τῆλλα,
 τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ else; and
 οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἢ everything
 ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἕδρα, ἢ ἂν κέηται οὐ ἄπτεται; else; and
 ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσ- the One
 θαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μεθ' ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν must be
 ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης, ἢ αὐτὸ ἐστίν. δεῖ out of com-
 γὰρ οὖν. οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὄν Τὸ Ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν munion
 ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ' ἂν ἢ with itself
 ἔν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει; οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη and τῆλλα,
 τῷ Ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήθ' ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ. everything
 ἢ αὐτῆ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν Ἄλλων ἄψεται. τί δῆ; else.
 ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὄν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ
 ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν
 ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι. ἀληθῆ. δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ
 ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι. δεῖ. ἐὰν δὲ

τοῖν δυοῖν ὄρουιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν ^b
 τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο. ναί. καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰεί,
 ἐνὸς προσγιγνομένου, μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται,
 καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκ-
 τησε τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ
 τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς
 πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ. ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν
 ἅμα ἐν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ^c
 ταῖς ἄψεσιν. ὀρθῶς. ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα τὸν
 ἀριθμὸν, αἰεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.
 ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστί, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν,
 ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη. πῶς γάρ; οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὰ Ἄλλα
 τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ
 ἄλλα ἐστίν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν
 τοῖς Ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γάρ;
 οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν ἔστι τὰ Ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ
 ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέεν. οὐ. τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἔστιν ^d
 ἐν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄψις ἄρα
 οὐκ ἔστι, δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοι. οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτ' ἄρα
 τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε τὰ Ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνός,
 ἐπεὶ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὔν. οὕτω δὴ κατὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα τὸ Ἐν τῶν τε Ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτε-
 ταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται. ἔοικεν. (8) ἄρ' οὔν καὶ
 ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄμισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις; πῶς;
 εἰ μείζον εἴη τὸ Ἐν ἢ τὰ Ἄλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τὰ Ἄλλα ^e
 τοῦ Ἐνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι
 τὸ Ἐν καὶ τὰ Ἄλλα ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω
 οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις
 ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαυτῷ εἶναι
 ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλα·

(8) The One admits of the modes of quantity, Equal, Greater, and Less, both with regard to itself and Ἄλλα, everything else.

εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ
 μέγεθος μὲν Τὸ ὄν, σμικρότητα δὲ Τᾶλλα, ὅποτέρω
 μὲν τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη, μείζον ἂν εἶη, ᾧ δὲ
 σμικρότης, ἔλαττον; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἐστὸν γέ τινε
 τούτω εἶδη, Τό τε Μέγεθος καὶ Ἡ Σμικρότης; οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν που, μὴ ὄντε γε, ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλου εἴτην
 150 καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ἐγγιγνοῖσθην. πῶς γὰρ ἂν; εἰ
 ἄρα ἐν τῷ Ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἦτοι ἐν ὄλω ἂν
 ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη. ἀνάγκη. τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὄλω
 ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ Ἐνὶ δι' ὄλου
 αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἶη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δῆλον δῆ.
 ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα Ἡ Σμικρότης τῷ Ἐνὶ
 ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἶη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; πῶς δ' οὐ;
 δυνατὸν οὖν Σμικρότητα ἴσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός,
 καὶ πράττειν γε τὰ Μεγέθους τε καὶ Ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ
 b μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν ὄλω ἄρα τῷ Ἐνὶ
 οὐκ ἂν εἶη Σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν μέρει. ναί.
 οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα
 ποιήσει ἄπερ πρὸς τὸ ὄλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ
 μέρους, ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐνῆ. ἀνάγκη. οὐδενί ποτε
 ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων Σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει
 μήτ' ἐν ὄλω ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν
 πλὴν αὐτῆς Σμικρότητος. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδ' ἄρα
 μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ. μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἶη
 c ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ Μεγέθους, ἐκείνο ἐν ᾧ Τὸ
 Μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὄντος,
 οὐ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, εἴανπερ ἦ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ
 ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ Σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι. ἀληθῆ.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ Μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ αὐτῆς
 Σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ Σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ
 Μεγέθους. οὐ γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα Τὰ Ἄλλα μείζω Τοῦ

Ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα
 ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτῶ τούτῳ πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἔχεται τὴν d
 δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς ἀλλήλω, οὔτε αὖ Τὸ Ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ Τῶν
 Ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδ' ἐλάττον εἴη, μήτε Μέγεθος
 μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὐκοῦν φαίνεται γε. ἄρ'
 οὖν εἰ μήτε μείζον μήτε ἐλάττον Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων,
 ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήθ' ὑπερέ-
 χεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήθ'
 ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου
 δὲ ὄν ἴσον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό e
 γε Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι μήτε Μέγεθος
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο
 οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὄν ἴσον ἂν εἴη
 ἑαυτῷ. πάντων μὲν οὖν. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ
 τοῖς Ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν αὐτό
 γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἂν εἴη ἐξῶθεν, καὶ
 περιέχον μὲν μείζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον
 δὲ ἐλάττον, καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἐλάττον εἴη 151
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν. εἴη γὰρ ἄν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε
 ἀνάγκη, μηδέεν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ Ἐνός τε καὶ Τῶν
 Ἄλλων. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ
 τό γε ὄν αἰεὶ. ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὄν ἐν
 μείζονι ἔσται ἐλάττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον
 ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γάρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν
 ἐστι χωρὶς Τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ Ἐνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ
 ἐν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά
 τε Ἄλλα ἐν τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις,
 ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν h
 ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ Ἄλλα τοῦ
 Ἐνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν ἐλάττον Τῶν

Ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ Ἄλλα ἐν τῷ Ἐνί, τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ Ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐλάττω. ἔοικεν. τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον καὶ ἐλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἐλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων

c καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐλαττον ἂν καὶ πλεόν εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις κατὰ ταῦτά. πῶς; ὄνπερ μείζον ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὄσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὄν ἐλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταῦτά. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ

d ἐλαττον ὄν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὄν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλεόν, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ. φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὰ Ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ Ἐν· ὅτι μὲν μείζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλεόν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἐλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς

e Ἄλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ αὐτῷ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεόν καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. ἔσται. (9) ἄρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ Ἐν, καὶ ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν Ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς;

(9) The One admits of the modes of duration, Prior, Simultaneous, and Sub-

sequent,
both with
regard to
itself and
ἄλλα,
everything
else.

εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἔστιν. ναί.
τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ 152
χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρε-
ληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος
οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ἔστι γάρ. μετέχει μὲν ἄρα
χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνν γε. οὐκοῦν
πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί. αἰεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτε-
ρον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι νεωτέρου γι-
γνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;
μεμνήμεθα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ^b
γίγνεται τὸ Ἐν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ
πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ
νεωτέρον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτως. ναί.
ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν
χρόνον ἦ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ
ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευομένον γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ
εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν. οὐ γάρ. ἄρ'
οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον,
ἐπειδὴν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχη, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι ^c
τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖον γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε
ληφθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖον οὕτως ἔχει
ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ
ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμ-
βανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε
ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ
παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ
τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει αἰεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε
τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον. φαίνεται. καὶ τὸ ^d
Ἐν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
νῦν, ἐπέσχε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύ-

τερον. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν οὐπερ ἐγίγνετο
 πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ;
 ναί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύ-
 τερον; ἔστιν. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ
 Τὸ Ἔν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
 e νῦν. ἀνάγκη. τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ πάρεστι τῷ Ἐνὶ
 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ αἰεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ἦ.
 πῶς γὰρ οὐ; αἰεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύ-
 τερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον Τὸ Ἔν. ἔοικεν. πλείω
 δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον;
 τὸν ἴσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνό-
 μενον ἢ ὄν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει. πῶς δ' οὐ; τὸ
 δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε
 νεώτερόν ἐστιν. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον
 χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄν οὔτε
 153 νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ γί-
 γνεται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δέ; Τῶν Ἄλλων; οὐκ ἔχω
 λέγειν. τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ Ἄλλα
 τοῦ Ἐνός, εἴπερ ἕτερα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω
 ἐστὶν ἐνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ
 ὄντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστὶ καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. ἔχοι
 γὰρ ἂν. πλῆθος δὲ ὄν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι
 ἢ τοῦ Ἐνός. πῶς δ' οὐ; τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν
 τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ
 τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον·
 b τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἔν· ἢ γάρ; ναί. πάντων ἄρα
 Τὸ Ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐχόντων. ἔχει
 δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἄλλα πάντα ἀριθμῶν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ
 ἄλλο ἐστίν. ἔχει γάρ. πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγο-
 νὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ Ἄλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δ'
 ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος·

καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἶη Τᾶλλα νεώτερα Τοῦ Ἐνός, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν πρεσβύτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων. εἶη γὰρ ἂν. τί δὲ τὸδε; ἄρ' ἂν εἶη Τὸ Ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ Τοῦ Ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου Τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μὴν; καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ὀλοῦ τε καὶ Ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἔν τε καὶ ὄλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτῇ δὲ οἶμαί γε ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἅμα Τὸ Ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ὥστ' εἶπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν Τῶν Ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἶη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἄρα Τῶν Ἄλλων Τὸ Ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δ' Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός πρεσβύτερα. οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται. τί δὲ δῆ; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτιοῦν Τοῦ Ἐνός ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν, εἴανπερ μέρος ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὃ τι περ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὀψοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὼν ὄλον ἔν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἔν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ. πᾶσιν ἄρα Τοῖς Ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει Τὸ Ἐν. ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔθ' ὕστερον Τῶν Ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἶη, ἀλλ' ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων 154

οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ Τάλλα
 Τοῦ Ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε
 καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ Τάλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως. πάν-
 μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός.
 ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον
 τε καὶ νεώτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός,
 καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι;
 ἄρα ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγ-
 νεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ
 τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον
 ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι, ἢ ὡς
 τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐκ
 ἂν ἔτι δύναίτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὄν ἔτι νεώτερον
 γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνω
 τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὀψοῦν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὄσῳ περ
 ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκ ἄρα τό-
 γε ὄν τοῦ ὄντος γίγνεται ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ
 νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ'
 ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον,
 γίγνεται δ' οὐ. ἀληθῆ. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ὄν Τῶν
 Ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον
 γίγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὄρα δὲ εἰ τῆδε πρεσβύτερα
 καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται. πῆ δὴ; ἢ Τό τε Ἐν Τῶν
 Ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός.
 τί οὖν; ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ἦ,
 πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ Τὰ Ἄλλα. ναί.
 πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· εἰ ἂν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνω
 προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ
 διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ;
 σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον
 ἦν πρὸς Τάλλα ἡλικία διαφέρων Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦτο καὶ

εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνουν χρόνον τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἔλαττον αἰεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρό-
 τερον ἢ οὐ; ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρουν
 ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ^e
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον
 πρότερον; νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ
 ἐκεῖνα αὖτ' ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἔν ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρό-
 τερον; πάνυ γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρε-
 σβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ
 πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ
 γίγνεται αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.
 τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γί- ¹⁵⁵
 γνεται ὡσαύτως. ἴοντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον
 τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
 πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον
 νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε
 εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιτο ἀλλ'
 εἶεν ἂν, νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων
 καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἔν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον
 γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὄν καὶ πρότερον
 γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔντος πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ^b
 ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἄλλα
 οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἔν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρε-
 σβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται
 γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ
 ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων αἰεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἔν τῶν
 ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε
 ἄλλα τοῦ ἔντος ἢ δὲ ἄλλῳ αἰεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν
 ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ^c

ὑστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίνεσθαι Τά τε Ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων; πάνν μὲν οὖν. κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ Ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίνε-
 ται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίνε-
 ται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ Ἐν καὶ τοῦ
 δ πρεσβυτέρον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίνεσθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη. ἦν ἄρα τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίνε-
 ται καὶ γενήσεται. τί μὴν; καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. πάνν γε. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράτ-
 τομεν. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπερ
 e καὶ περὶ τὰ Ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ Ἐν ἔστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. (1) τὸ Ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἔν τε ὄν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἔν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἔν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτὲ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει, οἶόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οἶόν τε. ἔν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἔν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.
 156 ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμ-

(III.) *The Third Hypothesis:*
 εἰ ἔν ἔστι = εἰ ἔν οὐσίας μετέχει, (1) *the One admits of contrary predicates by means of the achronic Point of In-difference,*

βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἶόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνη αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφή; οὐδαμῶς. τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. Τὸ ἔν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιέν οὐσίαν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη. (2) ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν, καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ἄρ' οὐχ, ^b ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλὰ, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὁμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί. καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἀξιάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; οὕτως. ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἴσθηται ^c καὶ ὅταν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλη, δεῖ δὴ που αὐτό γε μῆδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δὴ; ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὑστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὑστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γάρ; χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε ἅμα μῆτε κινεῖσθαι μῆθ' ἐστάναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ἂν οὔτε κινούμενον ^d μεταβάλλοι, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἶη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι

(2) in which, it admits of neither contrary.

ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινου-
 μένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις
 ἀτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξύ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ
 c σταάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ
 καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. κινδυνεύει.
 καὶ Τὸ Ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μετα-
 βάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἐκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφό-
 τερα ποιεῖ· μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει,
 καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ
 κινεῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη. οὐ γάρ. ἄρ' οὖν
 οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ
 157 τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
 εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται
 κινήσεών τε καὶ σταάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε
 οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γοῦν.
 κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν
 καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἓν οὔτε ἓν ἐστίν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε
 διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ
 ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον
 οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον.
 b καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ
 ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε
 αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.
 οὐκ ἔοικε. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι
 Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὔ;

τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, Ἐν εἰ (IV.) *The*
 ἔστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον. (1) λέγωμεν *Fourth Hy-*
 δὴ, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέαι; *pothesis:*
 λέγωμεν. οὐκοῦν ἐπέειπερ ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνός ἐστιν, *the effect of*
 οὔτε τὸ Ἐν ἐστι τἄλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνός *the exist-*
ence of the
One on
τἄλλα:
they

admit contrary predicates.

(1) If the One exist, Τάλλα will not be one; but

(2) Τάλλα cannot be altogether unconnected with the One, but

(3) will bear to it the relation of Fractional Parts to an Integral Whole; and in the same way

(4) each Part is related to Unity as the Parts of the Whole are related to Unity; and, therefore,

(5) as Τάλλα both in the Whole and in the Parts cannot be Unity, Τάλλα, when considered alone, can only have the relation of Indefinite

ἦν. ὀρθῶς. (2) οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι c
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Τάλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πη. πῆ δὴ; (3) ὅτι
 ποῦ Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν.
 εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἐν εἶη. ὀρθῶς.
 (4) μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾗ.
 φαμέν γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἕκαστον
 γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρῆ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 ὅλον. πῶς τοῦτο; εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἶη, ἐν οἷς
 αὐτὸ εἶη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δὴ που μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἐστὶν d
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων δὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ
 καὶ πάντων. ἐνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου
 τῶν Ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται
 μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν
 πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν πάντων τούτων τι
 εἶναι, ὦν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο
 ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. φαίνεται γε δὴ. οὐκ ἄρα
 τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ
 μιᾶς τινὸς ιδέας καὶ ἐνός τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, e
 ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν
 τὸ μόριον εἶη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τάλλα
 μόρια ἔχει, καὶ Τοῦ Ὀλοῦ τε καὶ Ἐνὸς μετέχοι. πάνυ
 γε. ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι
 Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. ἀνάγκη. (5) καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ
 τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ
 τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν Τοῦ Ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον
 αὐτῶν μόριον ἐστὶ, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐν δὴ που 158
 σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν Ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ
 δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται. ὀρθῶς. μετέχοι δέ γε
 ἂν Τοῦ Ἐνός δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἢ ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν. νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι

πλήν αὐτῷ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που. ἀδύνατον. μετέ- Quantity
 χειν δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὄλω καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. to an index,
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὄλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ therefore
 δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου, οὗ ἂν ἦ μόριον
 b ὄλου. οὕτως. (6) οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς (6) Ἄλλα
 μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἕτερα will be,
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μήθ' ἐν μήθ' when taken
 ἐνὸς πλείω εἴη Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. οὐ apart from
 γὰρ οὖν. ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἐνός ἐστι τὰ τε Τοῦ Unity, in-
 Ἐνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ definite ;
 ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτὰ γε ἐκεῖνα taken in
 τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα Τοῦ Ἐνός; πῶς; ὡδε ἴδωμεν. conjunction with
 ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός τότε, Unity,
 c ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; δῆλα δῆ. definite ;
 οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς Τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ἔνι; πλήθη and, there-
 μέντοι. τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιού- fore,
 των ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἰοί τε ἐσμεν ὃ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνός
 μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἔνι; ἀνάγκη.
 οὐκοῦν οὕτως αἰεὶ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν
 ἐτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους, ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰεὶ ὀρώμεν,
 ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. καὶ
 d μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται,
 πέρασ ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, καὶ
 τὸ ὄλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τοῖς
 Ἄλλοις δῆ Τοῦ Ἐνός ξυμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν Τοῦ Ἐνός
 καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι
 γίνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δῆ πέρασ παρέσχε πρὸς
 ἄλληλα· ἢ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.
 φαίνεται. οὕτω δῆ τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός καὶ ὅλα καὶ
 κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τε ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

(7) Τάλλα will admit of the opposite predicates of Similarity and Dissimilarity, and of the other modes of Quality above enumerated.

πάνυ γε. (7) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ὀ
ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῆ δὴ; ἦ μὲν που ἄπειρά
ἔστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦτὸν πεπον-
θότα ἂν εἴη ταύτη. πάνυ γε. καὶ μὴν ἦ γε ἅπαντα
πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτὸν
πεπονθότα. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἦ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε
εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις
ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἐναντία 159
γε ὡς οἶόν τε ἀνομοιότατα. τί μὴν; κατὰ μὲν ἄρα
ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοία ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ
ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά
τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα. κινδυνεύει. οὕτω δὴ τὰ Ἄλλα
αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια
ἂν εἴη. οὕτως. καὶ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων,
καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία
πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα Τάλλα
Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα. b
ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

(X.) The Fifth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ ἔστι: the effect of the existence of the One on Τάλλα farther considered, i. e., Τάλλα owe their contrary and all other predicates to Τὸ Ἐν.

οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπι-
σκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως
ἔχει τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός ἢ οὕτω μόνον; πάνυ μὲν
οὖν. λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ
Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄρ'
οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ
Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός εἶναι; τί δὴ; ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι
παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἄλλο
δὲ τῶν Ἄλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῆ τὸ
τε Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. πάντα γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν
ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τὸ τε Ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ,
καὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταῦτῳ ἔστι
Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί.

(1) If Τάλλα be distinct from the One, and if

(2) οὐδὲ μὴν μόρια γὰρ ἔχειν φαμέν Τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔν. πῶς γάρ; οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἶν ἂν Τὸ Ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. πῶς γάρ; οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχει ἂν τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ Ἐνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῆ ἄρα ἐν τὰ ἅλλα ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδ' ἄρα πολλὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἅλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὐθ' ἐν οὔτε πολλὰ οὐθ' ὅλον οὔτε μόρια ἐστὶ τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει. ὀρθῶς. (3) οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἅλλα οὔτε ἕνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ Ἐνός πανταχῆ στέρεται. οὕτως. (4) οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τῶ Ἐνὶ τὰ ἅλλα, οὔτε ἕνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἶν ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο ποῦ εἶδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ Ἐνός. φαίνεται. ἦν δὲ γὰρ ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἢ μὴδ' ἑνὸς μετέχειν. ἀδύνατον. οὐτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐτ' ἀνόμοια ἐστὶν οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρα τὰ ἅλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδους μετέχει, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίων· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ τι τοιούτων πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἅλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον

the One and τὰ ἅλλα be an exhaustive division, there can be no middle term between the two, therefore, (2) τὰ ἅλλα can in no way admit the One, either fractionally or integrally, nor can τὰ ἅλλα admit Plurality, which is a mode of the One, and, therefore, (3) not Two, or any other number, each of which is a repetition of Unity; and, therefore, (4) not of Similarity or Dissimilarity, or any other mode of Quality whatsoever, if the One be completely eliminated. The conclusion of the four last hypotheses is: that, if the One exist, the One must exist as all actual individual

existences, and the One, being so far pluralized, cannot be one; and both these propositions hold, with regard to the One when considered both apart from τᾶλλα, and likewise in relation to τᾶλλα (Hypotheses 2 and 3); and both these propositions hold, with regard to τᾶλλα when considered both in relation to the One (Hypothesis 4), and also when considered apart from the One (Hypothesis 5).

ἐφάνη μετέχειν, Τοῦ Ἐνός γε πάντα πάντως ἕστερομένοις. ἀληθέστατα. οὕτω δὲ ἔν ἐἴ ἔστι, πάντα τέ ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ οὐδέν ἔστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ. τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἔν μὴ ἔστιν; ἀρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἔστιν; διαφέρει μέντοι. διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τούναντίον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἔστι, τοῦ εἰ ἔν μὴ ἔστιν; πᾶν τούναντίον. τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰ Μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ Σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν Ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπη ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; ἴσμεν. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπη ἔν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδέν γὰρ ἦττον γινώσκειται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, ἀ καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ; ἀνάγκη.

ὦδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. (1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γινώσκεισθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπη ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἔστιν. ἀληθῆ. (2) οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ Ἄλλα ἕτερ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν Ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἑτεροιοῦτης ἄρα ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῆ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν Ἄλλων ἑτεροιοῦτητα λέγει, ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν ἕτερον τῶν Ἄλλων λέγη, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου. φαίνεται. (3) καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου

(B.) The negative argument. The meaning of Negation: Negation implies knowledge and difference.

(VI.) The Sixth Hypothesis: ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἔστι = εἰ τὸ ἔν ἔστι μὴ

καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ Ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἴ μῆτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μῆτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. ὀρθῶς. εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ Ἐνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ 161 γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε Ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μῆτε τὸ Ἐν μῆτ' ἐκείνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ Ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι. καὶ πάνυ γε. (4) καὶ Ἐνομοιότης ἄρ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ Ἄλλα, τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα, ἕτεροῖα καὶ εἶη ἂν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἕτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοῖα; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἄλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἶη. δῆλον. εἶη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ Ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν. εἰκέν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ Ἐνὶ, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἶη οἷον τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἶη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός. πάνυ γε. οὐ δεῖ δέ γε. οὐ δῆτα. δεῖ ἄρ' ὁμοιότητα τῷ Ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι. δεῖ. (5) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἶη ἴσον, εἶη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὁμοιον ἂν εἶη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν. ἀδύνατα.

ὄν, if the One is non-existent—μὴ ὄν—τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὄν admits of the contrary predicates, Production and Destruction, and is subject to neither Production nor Destruction.
 (1) Non-existence implies Knowledge, and (2) Difference, and, therefore, the non-existent One must be distinguished from τὰ ἄλλα, everything else; (3) the non-existent One admits of the various relations (4) of Dissimilarity to τὰ ἄλλα, everything else, and therefore of Similarity with itself:

(5) of Equality, Excess, and Defect;

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἀρ' οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη καὶ τᾶλλ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη.
 τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; ναί. τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ
 τῷ ἄνισῳ ἄνισα; πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ ἄνισότητος δὴ
 μετέχει τὸ ἔν, πρὸς ἣν τᾶλλ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἄνισα; d
 μετέχει. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἄνισότητός γ' ἐστὶ μέγεθος
 τε καὶ Σμικρότης. ἔστι γάρ. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ
 μέγεθος τε καὶ Σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί; κινδυ-
 νεύει. μέγεθος μὴν καὶ Σμικρότης αἰεὶ ἀφέστατον
 ἀλλήλοιν. πάνυ γε. μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν αἰεὶ
 ἐστίν. ἔστιν. ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ
 αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. ὅτῳ ἄρα
 ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ,
 μεταξὺ τούτων οὔσα. φαίνεται. τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ e
 ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετεῖη καὶ Μεγέ-
 θους καὶ Σμικρότητος. ἔοικεν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ
 οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη. πῶς δὴ; ἔχειν
 αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι,
 οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἔν μὴ
 εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν
 ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν
 ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.
 ἀνάγκη. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἔν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ 162
 γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς
 τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθύς ἔσται ὄν. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
 δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι
 μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ
 μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ᾗ. οὕτως
 γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ
 ἂν εἶη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν,
 μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως b

(6) of Existence, and, therefore,

εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. οὐκοῦν ἐπέειπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ Ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ Ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὐ;

(7) οἶόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως; οὐχ οἶόν τε. πάν

^e ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη. πῶς δ' οὐ; μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις, ἣ τί φήσομεν; κίνησις. οὐκοῦν τὸ Ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη; ναί. οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται. ἔοικεν. καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπέειπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι. πῶς γάρ; οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινούτ' ἂν.

^d γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταυτοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται. ὄν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ταυτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὄν στρέφεισθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται που τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ Ἐνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλον τινός. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταυτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πῃ ἔτι κινούτο; πῶς γάρ; τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν,

(7) of transition from its essence, Non-existence, to its accident, Existence, and, therefore,

(8) of all the other predicates of modification, Motion, and Production in either direction.

τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι. ἀνάγκη. Τὸ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται. ἔοικεν. (8) καὶ μὴν εἶπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὅπη γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον 163 οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως. οὕτως. κινούμενον δὴ Τὸ ἄρα καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. ναί. καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο. οὐ γάρ. ἦ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἔν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ἦ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. φαίνεται. τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε b γίνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ὄν γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

(VII.) *The Seventh Hypothesis*: ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι = οὐ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας: Τὸ ἄρα admits of no relation or predicate whatsoever.

(1) If non-existence mean the absence of Existence, the non-existent One cannot in any way

αὐθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν, ὁψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα. ἀλλὰ χρή. οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ c περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνειν; ναί. (1) τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναί τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἦ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλοῦστατα μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναίτο ἂν τὸ μὴ δὲ οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν. οὐ γάρ. d

(2) τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἦ, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ᾧ δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὐτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὐτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό. πῶς γάρ; Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν, οὐθ' ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς. εἰκός. οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει οὐσίας. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῆ; ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τούτο πάσχον. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ ἐστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι. τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ποθ' ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. μὴ γὰρ οὔν. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν του μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν του μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι. (3) of any mode of Quantity by way of Equality, Excess, or Defect, nor (4) of their results—Similarity or Diversity—and,

164 δῆλον. οὔτε ἄρα Μέγεθος οὔτε Σμικρότης οὔτε Ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. (4) οὐδὲ μὴν Ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ Ἐτεροιοότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα εἶη ἂν αὐτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. τί δέ; Τἄλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἶη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐτ' ἄρ' ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτ' οὐθ' ἕτερα ἔστιν αὐτῷ Τὰ Ἄλλα. οὐ γάρ. (5) τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω, ἢ τὸ τί, ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται. οὕτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ. οὔκουν δὴ εἰσὶν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ. (5) therefore, as a general conclusion the One, as non-existent, cannot exist in any possible way.

b οὔκουν δὴ εἰσὶν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ. ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰ Ἄλλα τί χρὴ (VIII.) The

Eighth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι = εἰ τὸ ἐν ἔστι μὴ-ἔν; the effect of the non-existence of the One on Ἐἴλλα—everything else, i.e., Ἐἴλλα admits of contrary predicates, but these predicates will be phenomenal only.

(1) If the One be non-existent, Ἐἴλλα, everything else, must be different; and
 (2) if different, Ἐἴλλα must be distinct, and, therefore,
 (3) distinct from something, and, therefore,
 (4) distinct *inter se* in some way or other, since the One does not exist; and, therefore,
 (5) as Unity is non-existent, Ἐἴλλα can only be distinguished *inter se* as

πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄλλα μὴν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν Ἐἴλλων λέγοιτο. οὕτως. (2) εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν Ἐἴλλων ὁ λόγος, Τά γε Ἐἴλλα ἕτερα ἔστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε Ἐἴλλο καὶ τὸ Ἐτερον; ἐγωγε. ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί. καὶ τοῖς Ἐἴλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται. ἀνάγκη. (3) τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἶη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστὶ· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτιλείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. ὀρθῶς. (4) κατὰ πλήθη ἄρ' ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστὶ. καθ' ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἶη, μὴ ὄντος ἐνός· ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνθ' ἐνός δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὀρθότατα. τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἶη Ἐἴλλα, εἰ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὦν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται; οὕτως. (5) καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων. πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται

- εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαιεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειν ἔλθειν· τοῦτο δ' εἶη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. εἰκός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; πῆ δὴ; ὅτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται
- b ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευταίαν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευταίη, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐτῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός. ἀληθέστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνός λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (7) οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν
- c ὀρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὄξυ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται Τοῦ Ἐνός μὴ ὄντος; ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα Τᾶλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός. δεῖ γάρ. (8) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; πῆ δὴ; οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτον φαίνεσθαι πεπονημένοι
- d καὶ ὁμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. οὕτως. (9) καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοὺς τε ἑαυτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους

masses, and not as genuine pluralities; and, therefore, (6) Number and its modes will only have an apparent existence, and, therefore, (7) there will be the appearance of a Minimum, which in turn will appear a *Majus* as contrasted with a still smaller *Minus*, and so on to infinity; hence, (8) in the absence of real unity, Unity will be a mere confused view arising from imperfect vision, closer inspection suggesting an infinite *Minus* as before; hence, (9) Similarity and Dissimilarity, and the other modes of Modification and Quality, will have an apparent exis-

tence only, for there is no unity to give them cohesion.

(IX.) *The Ninth Hypothesis*: $\xi\nu$ εἰ μὴ ἔστι = εἰ εἶναι. $\tau\delta$ Ἐν οὐ πη οὐσίας μετέχει; the effect of the non-existence of Unity on $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, i. e., $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ lose their phenomenal existence, and the result is absolute Nothing. (1) In the total absence of Unity, the notion of Unity and therefore of Plurality is impossible, and, therefore,


(2) of Similarity and Dissimilarity, and of all other modes of Quality and Quantity which are based on Unity.

πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνο-
μένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα
που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἦδη ἡμῖν, εἰ
ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλά ἔστιν. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.


ἔτι δὴ ἄπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπω-
μεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ δὲ τοῦ Ἐνός, τί χρὴ
εἶναι. εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ
ἔσται $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$. πῶς γάρ; οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε ἐν
γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἔν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν
αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἔν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν
πολλά εἴη. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνότος δὲ ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς
Ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλά οὐθ' ἔν ἐστι $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$. οὐ γάρ.
οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δὴ; ὅτι $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ 166
τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν
κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν
Ἄλλων τῶ ἐστὶν. οὐδέν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ
οὖσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ
τοῖς Ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζ-
ζεται οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἄλλων.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται
τι τῶν Ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνὸς b
πολλά δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἐν ἄρα
εἰ μὴ ἔστι, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν
οὐδὲ πολλά. οὐκ ἔοικεν. (2) οὐδ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ
ἀνόμοια. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἕτερα,
οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς
πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων
οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴπομεν, ἐν εἰ c
μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴπομεν; παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν.

εἰρήσθω τοῖνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἐν The sum of
 εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ Τάλλα καὶ the affirma-
 πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί negative
 τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. arguments
 ἀληθέστατα. is: **affir-**
 matively,
 that if the
 One exists,
 the One,
 both in re-

lation to itself and in relation to Τάλλα, exists in every mode of conditioned existence, and in its opposite, and so, the One is not unconditioned or absolute unity, so far as it exists in these modes: **negatively**, if the One does not exist, then all existence both in relation to Unity, and in itself, is phenomenal, and this phenomenal existence, when closely scrutinized, is entirely destitute of even phenomenal Unity, and therefore of all categories of Quantity and Quality whatsoever. The conclusion therefore is: the Universe—Τὸ Πᾶν—is neither ἐν alone nor πολλὰ alone, but ἐν-καὶ-πολλὰ.



NOTES.



NOTES.

THE piece is a monologue by Cephalus of Clazomenae. The conversation between the philosophers is supposed to have been originally reported by Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato, and then retailed by Antiphon to Cephalus. Plato, by selecting Antiphon, who is a sporting character, fond of horses (126 c), perhaps wishes to hint that Antiphon has not tampered with the dialogue, ἡκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, as he says of Aristotle (137 b), and thus offers it as the exposition of his own views. He may also have wished to compliment his half-brother Antiphon, just as he introduces Glauco and Adimantus in the *Republic*. The monologue is thus, on the face of it, a hearsay of a hearsay. Hermann, to get rid of some chronological difficulties, which are insuperable, makes Glauco and Adimantus cousins, and not brothers, of Antiphon. But it is vain to look for the precision of modern history in an ancient imaginative composition. Such exactness is the result of matter-of-fact habits, and of abundant means of verification, such as books of reference, &c. No such habits or means existed till the other day. A strong proof of this is the inaccuracy of quotation, common to all ancient writers, even professed critics.

126 a.

Κλαζομενῶν.

Stallbaum points out that some people in Clazomenae, townspeople, and perhaps followers of Anaxagoras, would

naturally take an interest in the discussion. The influence of Anaxagoras on Platonic thought is evidenced by the *Phaedo*. To Anaxagoras, Mind owes the recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. He set it in a sphere apart, and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, *i.e.* unlimited or untrammelled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only real existence. Plato is fond of putting doctrines which he adopts into the mouth of a person of the original school. Thus Timæus expounds physics, and the Eleatic Stranger metaphysics, and the more practical Socrates ethics.

126 c.

Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης.

Parmenides and Zeno are described by Strabo as ἄνδρες Πυθαγόρειοι, vi. 1. Their connexion with Pythagoreanism is philosophically real, as one column of the Pythagorean συστοιχία is reducible to τὸ πέρας, and the other to τὸ ἄπειρον.

127 b.

Πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι.

Such a feat of memory, though here a dramatic fiction, cf. *Symp.* 172 a, is rendered plausible by Niceratus's statement that he could repeat the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: Xen. *Conv.* iii. 5. Many rhapsodists could do the same: *ibid.* 6.

127 b.

παιδικά.

λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι show that Stallbaum's charitable explanation is untenable. There is no doubt suggested of their present friendship: Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὑγκειῶσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι, 128 a.

127 e.

εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα.

The argument is as follows:—In the order of Time or subjectivity, the perception of difference between two things A and B precedes the perception of their similarity; but in the order of existence or objectivity, the differentia of each of the differents depends on the individual peculiarities of each different. Each of the relatives thus exhibits Identity in relation to itself, and Difference in relation to the other, and so to all other things. If we assume, then, with Zeno, for argument's sake, τὸ πᾶν—existence—τὰ ὄντα—to be plural, each of τὰ ὄντα is *per se* ὁμοιον; but the aggregate is plural, and therefore τὰ ὄντα being plural are distinct, and therefore *inter se* ἀνόμοια. Zeno accordingly agrees with Leibnitz as to the identity of indiscernibles, thus: Indiscernibles are identical, and therefore non-plural, since primordial things cannot be differenced *inter se* without having been previously differenced *per se*. The Platonist and Hegelian say Plurality is subsumed by Unity without being destroyed by it. The *Aufhebung* settles everything.

127 e.

Τὰ ἀνόμοια.

Stallbaum remarks: Zeno callida conclusione effecit, non esse multa, quum hoc tantum consequatur, non posse huic eidemque rei eadem spectatae ratione plura eaque contraria attribui. To a Greek, the order of Notions would be Motion, Change, Plurality; Motion denoting not merely physical Motion, ποθέν ποι, but the notional movement of Metaphysics. The identity, in the Hegelian sense, of Cause and Effect, is the notion which brings the scientific order of Time into harmony with the order of Logic.

128 d.

εἰ ἓν ἐστι.

Sc. τὸ Πᾶν. This is the Subject of the Proposition, for which Philosophy undertakes to find the Predicate:

τὸ πᾶν is ἔν, said the Eleatic; it is πολλά, said the Ionic: it is ἐν καὶ πολλά, said Plato, and to prove this is the gist of the *Parmenides*.

128 d. εἰ πολλά ἐστίν: sc. τὸ Πᾶν.

The gist of Zeno's argument has been perpetually mistaken: Zeno does not deny Motion as a fact, but argues that as implying change, and therefore dissimilarity, it conflicts with the changeless uniformity of the One. In the One there is no contrariety, while contrariety is the essence of Motion. It may be remarked that, if Zeno's two moving bodies be made conscious, one will have double the consciousness of the other. The order of analysis is—Motion implies change, and change plurality. (See Appendix A.)

129 d. ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων.

This is irreconcilable with ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλοῦς, 127 c. If we leave out Cephalus the reciter and Glaucus, who does not speak, we can count up seven persons, viz., Adimantus and Antiphon in the introduction; Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, and Aristotle in the discussion. ἑπτὰ shows that Plato either forgot the original plan or did not care to adhere to it—another proof of the historical unreality of the piece.

130 b. Χωρίς.

Χωρίς, a notion derived from physical separation: things are properly χωρίς which are not ἀπτόμενα, and then the word is applied to things which, as existing under totally distinct conditions, differ in kind. It should be recollected that all notions which differ in any degree are metaphysically distinct, *e.g.* 3 and 4 are as distinct as 3 and 4 millions.

Moderns look principally to the origin or genesis of things and notions in determining their resemblance or difference, and not to their characteristics when matured.

131 d. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ.

With Hermann, I retain the Vulgate *τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ*. Heindorf's *τούτου δὲ αὐτὸ* is plainly wrong. The argument is: If any of us shall have a fragment of smallness, the real smallness will be bigger, because it is the whole, of which the fragment is a part.

131 e. μεταλαμβάνειν.

μεταλαμβάνειν is a more material expression than *μετέχειν*. Both, however, express the truth, that the Sensible element, in cognition, without the Intelligible, is inconceivable. Professor Huxley invests Sensation with all the Categories, and then tells us we do not want them. Sensibles have, in Hegel's words, *Richtigkeit*, and not *Wahrheit*.

132 a, b. The unique εἶδος.

This passage gives the reason why the *εἶδος* is unique:—In referring an object to a class we have two things in hand, the particular instance and the genus, *e.g.* the particular man, Socrates, and the genus man, *i.e.* the first and second intentions. Parmenides argues, that to connect the particular with the genus there must be a third concept or notion, and then another to comprehend the three, and so on to infinity. If this be so, *εἶδος* is not unique, but *ἄπειρον*. Now, *ἄπειρον* denotes privation of all *πέρας*, Limitation, therefore of Form, therefore of all Cogitability. But every thing must be either *ἐν* or *ἄπειρον*, as follows:—In strict logic, the contrary of *τὸ ἄπειρον* is *τὸ πεπερασμένον*; but *τὸ πεπερασμένον* yields on analysis—(1) *τὸ πέρασ*; and (2)

something which is not τὸ πέρας, and so ἄπειρον. What is τὸ πέρας, when out of any definite relation to τὸ πεπερασμένον? It must be quantifying power, and we must hold that power to be not plural, but unique; for plural equipollent powers, if adverse, cancel; and if corroborative, result in unity. Τὸ πέρας, therefore, must be ἕν, and therefore Τὸ Ἔν; for the ultimate Form must be one, and, without τὸ ἕν, as Plato afterwards proves, οὐδὲ φαίνεταιι. The εἶδος, therefore, since it is Form, cannot be ἄπειρον, and therefore must be one. This is Plato's answer to the objections urged in *pars.* 7 and 9, and known to Greek Logicians as ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. "We may remark," says Mr. Jowett, "that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end," III. p. 237. Plato, in the *Philebus*, gives the rationale of the Universal. (See Appendix B.)

132 c.

Objection to Conceptualism.

Either each thing consists of νοήματα, *i. e.* acts of intelligence, and therefore each thing is the being intelligent, *i. e.* intelligence, or if it be an act of intelligence, it is unintelligent, *q. a. e.* This argument is a case of the Platonic principle ὁμοιον ὁμοίω γινώσκειται. It is substantially the same as Berkeley's position that mind is mind, that therefore nothing but mind is mind, and, as a further consequence, that nothing but mind can have the properties of mind; it is therefore illogical to ascribe to that which is not mind the properties of mind. Plato does not hold νοῦς to be the ultimate existence either in the moral or in the physical sphere. In the ethical sphere we have Τάγαθόν, *Rep.* VI. 509 b; in the physical, ψυχή: Τούτω δέ [*sc.* νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε] ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἂν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἀλλοῦ πλὴν ψυχῆν, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τάληθεις ἐρεῖ, *Tim.* 36 c; σοφία

μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην, *Phil.* 30 c. M. Ribot overlooks Plato when he says, "Since Will is the centre of ourselves and of all things, we must give it the first rank. It is its due, though since Anaxagoras Intelligence has usurped its place" (*La Philosophie de Schopenhauer*, p. 69, cited in H. Zimmern's *Sch.* p. 102). The same doctrine is developed as to the priority of ψυχὴ—Motive and Vital Energy—in the *Laws*, written in the "sun-set of life."—x. 891 e, *sqq.*

133 c.

ἀπίθανος = δυσανάπειστος, 135 a.

133 d.

οὔτω and οὔτως.

With regard to the orthography of these words, the insertion of ς before a vowel is plausible. But we must recollect that we can prove that $\tau\acute{\iota}$ was not elided, and that μέχοι and ἄχοι had no ς .

134 c. *Objection to the Absolute from the subjective side.*

This brings out the true sense of absolute—Τὸ ἀνυπόθετον, *Rep.* vi.—that which does not depend on anything else for its essence, or outcome, or priority—λόγω—in order of thought. Of course, *quá γνωστόν* to us, it depends on us; but the Absolute may be and is *γνωστόν* to itself. With regard to us, it is ultimum relatum; with regard to itself, it is not referred to anything else.

135 a. *Objection to the Absolute from the objective side.*

This objection is urged by both Hamilton and Mill, ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρῶν; but it assumes that because partial knowledge is not plenary knowledge, they therefore contra-

dict each other. How is the geography of Ireland contradictory to the geography of Europe? Plenary knowledge, of course, will correct partial knowledge, and may put it in quite a new light, but the facts on which the partial knowledge is grounded cannot be shaken by the fullest knowledge. Aristotle objects ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἢ οὐσία. If χωρὶς means that there is a bridgeless chasm between the two, the objection holds—not otherwise. Sense and Intellect are essentially χωρὶς, yet every act of Perception is a blending of both. That the objective sphere, or Things-in-themselves, is unknown and unknowable to us, is held by Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Comte. This doctrine is favoured by the antithesis between phenomenon and reality. As a matter of fact, the Greek word is in the present participle, *i. e.* φαινόμενον, and meant *that which is in the course of appearing*, and not φανέν, that which did appear. In a word, the modern means by φαινόμενον what the Greeks call φάντασμα, a kind of delusive appearance. Carneades distinguishes the act of perception into three parts—τὸ φανταστόν, the object; τὸ φαντασιούμενον, the subject; and φαντασία, the act. Now Plato's meaning is, that τὰ φαινόμενα, ὅρ τὰ γιγνόμενα, are possible, because they are produced by permanent reality which is discernible through them. For his conception of genesis of phenomena, see note 154 c.

137 c-143 a.

Τὸ ἕν.

Τὸ ἕν, all through the first proposition, means pure unity prior to all evolution. Like Hegel's *Seyn*, it has not been stripped of attributes, but is prior to all attributes. It is, like the *Seyn*, a postulate of completed thought.

137 d.

πέρας.

Πέρασ is the limit *ab intra*: cf. τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου: hence, as τὸ ἕν has neither *ab intra*, it is ἀπειρον.

This is taken from Melissus *Τὸ δὲ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε τελευτήν, ἄπειρον τυγχάνει ἔον.* Fr. 2. Plato does not discuss the other possibility, argued by Melissus, that *ἄπειρον* could have limits *ab extra*: for there cannot be more than one *τὸ ἔν.*

137 e.

Plato's right line.

This definition is exact: it is obvious there can only be one such line; and, if it is unique, it follows it is the shortest in *rerum natura*. If Helmholtz's reasoning-beings of two dimensions living on the surface of a sphere understood the definition given by Plato, they would see it to be the shortest possible, and that their own geodetic line was not. If they liked to call the latter straight, of course they might; which is as irrelevant as the entire of Helmholtz's argument.

138 c.

αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

In the *Laws*—893 b—895—ten modes of motion are specified. Eight of these belong to body: (1), without change of place, *i.e.* on an axis; (2), with change of place—(a), either without change of base, *e.g.* a stone sliding on ice; (β), or with change of base, *e.g.* a ball rolling. The next two are where motion gives rise to—(3), concretion, or (4), decrection. The next two are where concretion is prolonged into (5) growth, or discrection turns into (6) waste. The next is where growth in bulk is prolonged into (7) production of state, and waste into (8) decay. The two movements of mind are (9) to move things other than itself, itself being moved; and (10) to move itself of itself out of a previous state of rest.

The power of transmitting motion as a link in the Chain of Sequence is the only power allowed man by Hume and his followers. The 10th motion includes free-will.

139 b-e.

The One has not Identity with itself or anything else that has distinctness: nor is it distinct from itself or anything else that has distinctness.

That is, the One, being one and nothing else, admits of no relation whatsoever; if it did, there would be unity and relation, something more than unity, and therefore not unity, *q. a. e.*

It cannot even possess Distinctness, for Distinctness means that A is distinct from B, and so B is in turn distinct from A. If, then, Unity possessed Distinctness, it could only be distinct by means of Unity and not by means of Distinctness; but Unity, *ex vi termini*, is not Distinctness. Therefore τὸ Ἐν cannot be distinct in itself. A similar argument was urged against St. Anselm, that Unity was not Perfection. The mode of argument is due to the Megarics. The *Aufhebung* is the answer.

139 d.

Source of τὸ ἕτερον.

I. e. supplying the ellipses εἰ μὴ τούτῳ—τῷ ἔν εἶναι—ἔσται ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται ἕτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται ἕτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἕτερον. (See note 127 e.)

141 c.

διαφορότης.

διαφορότης was read by Proclus, T. vi. 237, and is supported by *ποιότης*, *Theaetet.* 182 a.

141 e.

γεγόνει.

For *γέγονεν*, Hermann reads *γεγόνει*, as *γέγονεν* has to be taken in two senses, perfect and past.

141 e. γενηθήσεται.

οὐτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται, *will neither come into being, nor be brought into being*; will neither come of itself, nor be brought by anything else.

141 e. Ambiguity of ἔν.

Τὸ ἔν οὔτε ἔν ἐστίν οὔτε ἔστιν, *i. e.*, Τὸ ἔν is neither the relation Unity, nor the quality Existence.

142 a. ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ.

εἴη ἄν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ, *would it have any affection resulting to it, or proceeding from it*: any income or outcome; *i. e.* either accident or property.

142 a. ὄνομα, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.

Plato gives the following explanation of these terms:—

ὄνομα = the term.

λόγος = definition.

ἐπιστήμη = ἐν ψυχᾷ ἐνόν, ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὄν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε λεχθέντων τριῶν, *i. e.* ὄνομα, λόγος, εἶδωλον.—*Epist.* VII. 342–3.

ἐπιστήμη is the psychical aspect of αὐτό, and is a process of intense activity. Plato objects to the sensible figure of the Circle, that it partakes of the Straight, *i. e.* is really a zigzag line. *The Circle* then would be the process of describing it without a sensible line (*Epist.* VII.), and in this way ἐπιστήμη resembles the Kantian schema. *The Epistles* are considered genuine by Cobet and Grote, and are very characteristic. At all events, the passage in the 7th could only have been written by a great metaphysician.

δόξα, ἐκ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.—*Phil.* 38 b.

αἴσθησις = τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινῇ γιγνόμενον, κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι.—*Phil.*, 34 a. This is scientifically true: the sensation lasts only as long as the impressed condition of the nerve is kept up.

142 b-155 e.

Τὸ ἔν.

In the second proposition, Τὸ ἔν is in combination with ἔστι. Each element is distinct before combination and in combination; though the combination may and does give rise to new relations.

142 d—e.

Relation of Τὸ ἔν and ὄν.

I. e. τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος (Τό τε Ἐν καὶ Τὸ ὄν), ἄρα ἀπολειπέσθον, ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μορίου, ἢ Τὸ ὄν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἶναι μορίου; *i. e.* where there is Τὸ Ἐν, Τὸ Ἐν is in combination with Τὸ ὄν, and Τὸ ὄν is in combination with Τὸ Ἐν.

εἶναι, *c. gen.* = *to be a property of*: cf. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μή-ὄντι εἶη ἄν τι, ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; 141 a. *Can a nonentity have either accident or property?*

142 e.

μόριον.

Each one μόριον—either τὸ Ἐν, or τὸ ὄν—of the two μόρια τὸ Ἐν and τὸ ὄν, holds in combination Ἐν and ὄν, and so on, *ad infn.*

This is strictly true: the universe has unity, and the universe exists; and each of the notes that people the sun's beam has equally existence and unity. One is Form: Existence is Matter, and to show that the One formulates existence into plurality is the aim of the second part of the *Parmenides*.

143 c.-144 a. *Genesis of Number, i.e. a system of Monads.*

There are three *συζυγίαι* or pairs, viz. :

οὐσία and *ἕτερον* ;

οὐσία and *ἔν* ;

ἔν and *ἕτερον*.

Now every pair is *ἄμφω*, and therefore *δύο* ; therefore each member of the pair is *ἐκάτερον*, and therefore one : so that in each pair we have two members,

$$2.1 = 2,$$

and each member being unified by the index 1, we have three symbols,

$$3.1 = 3.$$

Now where there is Two, we have *δις ἔν*, and where there is Three, we have *τρις ἔν* ; where, therefore, there are three symbols, we have two members

$$(2 \text{ m. } 1 = \text{δις ἔν ὄντων}),$$

and where there are two members we have three symbols

$$(3 \text{ symbols } . 1 = 1 \text{ τρις ἔν ὄντων}).$$

Three (symbols) therefore must be two (members), and two (members) must be three (symbols). Therefore *ἄρτια* (= *δύο* = *δις ἔν*) = *ἀρτιάκις* (= *δις*) *ἔν* : and *περιττά* (= *τρία* = *τρις ἔν*) = *περιττάκις* (= *τρις*) *ἔν* : and *ἄρτια* (= *δύο*, *i.e.* members) = *περιττάκις* (= *τρις*) *ἔν*, *i.e.* symbols ; and *περιττά* (= *τρία*, *i.e.* symbols) = *ἀρτιάκις* = (*δις ἔν*) members. From this we have the genesis of every number : for $2 = \text{δις ἔν}$ is *ἄρτια ἀρτιάκις*, that is even numbers even times ; and $3 = \text{τρις ἔν}$ is *περιττά περιττάκις*, that is, odd numbers odd times ; and 2 (members) = 3 (symbols) is *ἄρτια*, even numbers odd times, *περιττάκις* ; and 3 (symbols) = 2 (members) is *περιττά*, odd numbers even times, *ἀρτιάκις*.

143 d.

οὐδὲ μία.

An instance of Plato's habit of using in the ordinary sense the philosophic word which is under argument : other examples are noticed in note on 157 d.

143 d.

οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα ; i. e. are there not three distinct symbols ? lit., are not the distinct things three ?

143 d.

Interdependence of 2 and 3.

Let there be two roots, x and y ; let them have a common index, say *e. gr.* 1; and let $x = 1$: then we have x^1, y^1 .

We have thus three distinct symbols, x, y , and 1; x and y denoting the two roots, and 1 the index common to both. Now, as there are three symbols, the three symbols involve the index twice; that is, x^1 and y^1 ; but x as a root = 1, and y is made one by its index;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y^1 = 1 + 1 = 2 \cdot 1 = 2.$$

Likewise the two roots x and y , and the identical index 1, require three symbols for their notation;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y \text{ and } 1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

To apply this:—Whatever admits of the predicate *both*, admits of the predicate *two*, and the predicate *two* indicates that each of the binaries is one. Now *one* as index being incorporated with each number of each syzygy, each syzygy involves the index twice;

$$\therefore 2 \cdot 1 = 2,$$

and as each syzygy requires, as we have seen, three symbols for its notation, each syzygy involves one thrice,

$$\therefore 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

Thus, in Aristotelian language, Three is the Form of Two, and Two is the Matter of Three. Hence, we may see why the Pythagoreans made Two the symbol of indefinite existence, for Matter without Form is indefinite; likewise why they made Three the symbol of definite existence. In the order of existence—*φύσει*—Three is prior to Two, for we require as prerequisites of Three

- (1). The radical 1; = 1 ξν;
- (2). The other thing; which = *Θάτερον*, being unquantified, to be construed to thought requires quantification, and thereto requires
- (3). The index 1.

Without these we cannot have Two, for $2 = 1$ and $1 = 2 \cdot 1$.

143 d-e. *Genesis of all the Numbers from Τὸ ἐν and Τὸ ὄν.*

Supplying ellipses—*δυοῖν ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δις ξν; καὶ τριῶν ὄντων εἶναι τρις ξν, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει Τῷ τε Δύο τὸ δις-ξν, καὶ Τῷ Τρία τὸ τρις-ξν; i. e. :*

$$\text{II.} = 2 \cdot 1, \text{ and III.} = 3 \cdot 1.$$

Then, *Δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δις-ξν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δις εἶναι; i. e.*

$$x^1 + y^1 = 1^1 + 1^1 = 1(1^1 + 1^1),$$

but

$$x \text{ and } y = 2, \text{ and the indices } 1 \text{ and } 1 = 2;$$

∴ we have *δύο δις* in the notion II.

$$\text{So mut. mut. of } 3 = 1(1^1 + 1^1 + 1^1) =$$

$$1x^1 + 1y^1 + 1 \cdot 1^1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3,$$

but

$$1 + 1 + 1 = 3;$$

and

$$x + y + 1' = 3;$$

and indices

$$1 + 1 + 1 = 3;$$

∴ we have *τρία τρις* in the notion III. That is, each couple is two things; it is also two single things; and the unity of each single thing is a third thing, i. e. *x* and *y* and 1.

In Aristotelian language:—Formed Matter contains (1) Form, and (2) Formless Matter = 1 + 1 = II.; but Formless Matter is incogitable; therefore we have Matter unified by Form. But Form = 1; Matter = 1; and Unification = 1; ∴ 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. The mote in the sunbeam contains three metaphysical elements—(1) that which unifies; (2) that which is unified; and (3) the unification of 1 and 2, i. e. III. It is a pity the scholastic distinction between *metaphysical* and *physical* is not kept up. Metaphysical entities were those that could not exist separately, e. g. concave and convex: physical, those that could, i. e. *λόγω* and *φύσει*.

143 e.

δις ὄντων.

Τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δις ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρις ὄντων. Hermann brackets the second ὄντων and ὄντων, but they are right, i. e. *τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δις ἐν ὄντων* = the symbols are three, and the pairs are two; and *δυοῖν ὄντων, καὶ τρις ὄντων* = *δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρις ἐν ὄντων*, the pairs are two and the symbols are three. It must be recollected that the Greek arithmetic was originally the geometry of rectangles. In the present case, as usual, in place of our abstract multiplication 3×2 and 2×3 , two rectangles are generated. The first has 3 as its base and 2 as its side, and as the base is the more important factor, the plural is used, ὄντων. In the second, 2 is the base and 3 the side; here the base is 2, and is the more important, hence the dual ὄντων. The conception is that a rectangle is described on a base, and not on a side. The rectangle 3×2 is quite distinct from the rectangle 2×3 .

144 a.

ἀριθμός does not mean a single unit, but a collection of units. Thus one is not ἀριθμός, but two is: ἀριθμός ἐστι πλῆθος ὠρισμένον ἢ μονάδων σύστημα ἢ ποσότητος χύμα ἐκ μονάδων συνκείμενον.—*Nic. Ger.* i. vii. 1.

In speaking of Numbers, both the Platonists and the Pythagoreans meant always whole numbers, and not fractions, the unit being the foot, lineal, square, and cubic. The numbers, or rather rectangles, were ἄρτιοι, an even base by an even side; περιττοί, an odd base by an odd side; ἄρτιοι περιττάκις, an even base by an odd side; and περιττοὶ ἀρτιάκις, an odd base by an even side.

144 e. Τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημένον.

Justifies ὑπὸ in 166 a.

145 c, d.

A part contains the following notions:—

1. Its separate existence;
2. Its own relation to its fellow parts;
3. Its common relation to the whole.

This may be illustrated by a piece of a dissected map. The map is not all the separate pieces one by one—τὰ πάντα—nor any one: yet if any piece did not fit, it would not be in the map when it was put together, τὰ ἅπαντα; but if the piece belong to the map, it must be one of the separate pieces.

Metaphysically, all distinct ideas are equally distinct.

145 c, d.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. (εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἔν τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἔν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι.)

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶη, τὸ πλεον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἶη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.

The Whole is distinct from the parts; for if the Whole is in each quaque of the parts, it must be in some one quavis; and if that particular part contains the Whole, that one part cannot be one of the parts.

The argument is: if the Whole is in the parts, it is in all, some, or one; the clause from ἐν τινι to εἶναι is the converse opposite of the clause εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. In the clause τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ [μὴ] ἔνι, Hermann brackets [μὴ]. I have struck it out, as it spoils the argument, which is: *if the Whole is in each part, it is in some one part. If so, the part thus specialised is differentiated from its former peers, but it is so differentiated by containing the Whole, not by not containing it.*

Hegel says: The relation of the Whole and the parts is untrue to this extent—that the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The notion of the Whole is to contain parts; but if the Whole is taken, and made what its notion implies, *i. e.*, if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a Whole.—*Logic*, p. 211. All through the *Parmenides* it must be kept in view, that any two notions in any degree distinct are totally distinct. “Each thing,” says Butler, “is what it is, and not another thing.”

Τὰ πάντα is the roll or litany of items; ἅπαντα is the sum total of the same items summed: Τὰ πάντα are the parts of the sum; ἅπαντα is the sum of the parts. It is a pity that modern English has lost its neuter plural and verb singular: “hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.”

145 e. ἧ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν.

The notion Whole is not the notion Aggregate of items :
cf. ἧ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον

τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ἔγωγς.—*Theact.* 204 a, b. The order of notions is—(1) τὰ μέρη; (2) τὰ πάντα; (3) τὰ ἅπαντα; (4) τὸ ὅλον; (5) τὸ πῦν.

145 e.

κινεῖσθαι.

Zeno's contribution to thinking is, the showing that motion is relative to a something which is not moved. This is well brought out in the Flying Arrow, which at any given moment coincides with its equivalent in the space through which it is passing.

146 a.

μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

By Excluded Middle; if not the one, it must be the other.

146 a, b.

ἕτερον.

Hegel's view, that Otherness is negation, is supported by the history of the particle *μή*. If *μή* is etymologically *ne*, as Curtius mentions, comparing the Lithuanian *nei* (I. 317), *na* in the Vedas very often means *as*, and the order then would be—assertion, comparison, negation: cf. *ἀνὰ* and *ἄλλος*, *ib.* 307.

146 a-148 e.

1. Everything possesses Identity, and, in that respect, it resembles primarily everything else.

2. Everything is distinct from everything else, and, in that respect, it differs primarily from everything else.

3. In being distinct, it, *eo ipso*, resembles secondarily everything else; and, therefore,

4. Differs secondarily from everything else by the contrary of diversity—identity.

Hence τὸ εἶν, in possessing either quality, has resemblances, primarily and secondarily, to

(a) itself, and to

(b) τἄλλα; and,

in possessing either quality, has diversities primary and secondary to

- (a) itself, and to
(b) $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

In possessing both, $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$

is primarily like itself and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, and
is primarily unlike itself and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

Nothing can be clearer than that Plato held that there were $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\iota$. Idealism is only the development of relations.

The One is identical and diverse to itself, and is identical and diverse to $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, *i. e.* all ideas or objects of Reason are equally ideas, and therefore distinct: they all agree in distinctness; but, being distinct, they differ; therefore they agree through Difference, they differ through Identity; and as each has both Identity and Diversity together, each agrees with and differs from itself, and each agrees with and differs from $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$. The One agrees with $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ in having both qualities; and the very having both qualities is the essence of its individuality.

148 c.

The order of notions is—

- (1) $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{o}\nu$;
(2) $\mu\eta \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$;
(3) $\mu\eta \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$;
(4) $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$.
 $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{o}\nu \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \text{ } \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$;
 $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \text{ } \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu$.

Taking each case separately :—

- (1). $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is like $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$;
(2). $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is unlike $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

Taking both together—

$\tau\acute{o} \epsilon\nu$ is both like and unlike $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$;

and so, by parity of reasoning,

$\tau\acute{o} \epsilon\nu$ is like and unlike itself.

148 d–149 e.

Ancient arithmetic was originally geometrical: hence the notions,

Whole and Parts :

Contact.

149 a.

Contact— $\acute{\alpha}\psi\iota\varsigma$ —presupposes—

1. Something distinct, *e. g.*

a — b ; and

2. Something else in immediate contiguity to it; *e. g.*

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{---} | \text{---} | \\ a \quad b \quad c. \end{array}$$

Here ab is distinct from bc , and bc is in immediate contiguity. If to bc we add cd ,

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{---} | \text{---} | \text{---} | \\ a \quad b \quad c \quad d, \end{array}$$

$\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ $\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\acute{\alpha}\psi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\omicron$. Hence, *ad fin.*, the things, $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$, are always one in advance of $\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\alpha}\psi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$. Hence, if $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ be totally devoid of unity, junction between $\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ is impossible, for $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ must be one, before it can combine with $\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ to form two.

149 e.

$\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$ $\gamma\epsilon$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$ $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$, *i. e.* essences, notions, $\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\iota$:

cf. *Phaed.* 78 c–d.

$\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$, Stall.

150 a. τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς.

τί τινος = attribute.

150 c-d.

Τὸ "Εν, *quá* "Εν, is ἐν, and nothing else : τᾶλλα *quá* ἄλλα, is ἄλλα, and nothing else : τὸ μέγεθος, *quá* μέγεθος, is μέγεθος, and nothing else : and ἡ σμικρότης, *quá* σμικρότης, is σμικρότης, and nothing else. Τὸ "Εν therefore cannot be greater than τᾶλλα, nor τᾶλλα greater than Τὸ "Εν : in the same way, neither is less than the other : but if neither greater nor less, they are not unequal, and therefore equal.

So it is commonly said, all infinites are equal. Metaphysically, there is only one infinite, that whose essence it is to have no bounds or limit. It is evident there cannot be two of this nature, for each would overlap, and so bound the other. But in mathematical infinites, infinity merely means infinitely divisible or infinitely addible ; *i. e.* a process which may be worked as long as there is anything to work on. The process is always one and the same, and so infinite: the material is always finite, and may be as different as one pleases.

150 d.

ὑπερέχω takes the genitive ; therefore the vexed passage in the *Phaedo* runs thus, if the ellipses are supplied—one of the surest ways of construing Plato:—Τοῦ μὲν Σωκράτους (τῷ μεγέθει τῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχειν) ὑπερέχων, *i. e.*, τῷ ὑπερέχειν = cause ; μεγέθει = instrument ; Σωκράτους *sub.* = gen. on ὑπερέχειν ; and τὴν σμικρότητα = acc. *de quo*.

151 a. μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτός τοῦ ενός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Grote says: "Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and com-

parisons of our own senses and consciousness. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One."—*Plato*, i. 105–6. Here "absolute" is used in the sense of out of all possible range, a sense popularised by the frivolous discussions of Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

151 d.

The order of notions is—

1. Magnitude;
2. Measure;
3. Parts.

151 d.

"*But that a thing, which bears no relation to any one (cuivis) given item, should bear any relation to each (cuique) of the sum total of items, to no one of which (cuiquam) does it bear any actual relation either as part or otherwise, is impossible.*"

151 d–e.

Shadworth Hodgson makes similar remarks on the subjective embracing the objective, and *vice versa*, *Space and Time*, pp. 45, *sqq.*

154 c–d.

Τὸ ἐν does not *grow* younger or older than τᾶλλα, because it is so already: it has had so much start, and equals added to unequals leave the difference absolutely as before; but, if we subtract the difference, the residue is always growing larger, and therefore the difference is growing less relatively to the residue: *e.g.* A is born a year before B; thus A is always a year older than B; but when A is two years old the relative difference is greater than when A is ninety.

154 c.

γίγνεται, the emphatic word, is not *growing* or *becoming*, because it *is*.

154 c.

γένεσις is explained in the *Laws* thus: *γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ' ἂν τι πάθος ᾗ; δῆλον, ὡς ὁπότεν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἔλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῆ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, 894 a.* The steps are—

1. αὔξη;
2. ἕξις καθεστηκυῖα;
3. ἕξις μένουσα.

155 c.

μεταλαμβάνειν differs from *μετέχειν*: *μεταλαμβάνω* is to coincide in part with, to have share in; *μετέχειν* is to form one with, to unite with; cf. 158 b.

155 e-157 a.

The One in this hypothesis passes from one state into another, and so do its attributes. The transition takes place through an unextended point: that is, time is cut in two by a timeless point, just as Space is cut in two by a breadthless line. Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point possessed duration. It is well explained by Damascius—*ἀμερές ἐστι τῆ ἰδιότητι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον.*

156 a-157.

The notion is, any one state or condition which passes into a different condition has to pass through an intermediate

state, in which it is neither what it was nor what it is in course of becoming. Anaxagoras, from whom Plato took much of his Physics, says: οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, Fr. 13 *Mullach*. This joined with his doctrine, adopted by Plato, that there is no minimum, οὔτε τοῦ μικροῦ γέ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἔλασσον αἰεί, necessitates the presence of τὸ ἐν in and out of Space and Time.

156 d-e.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης . . . (see 155 e).

157 b-159 b.

Here Τᾶλλα owe their predicates to their participation of τὸ ἐν. *Cetera* and *ceterum* are very inadequate renderings of the Greek neuter plural, Τᾶλλα expressing neither unity nor plurality, but food for both.

157 b.

Here we have the full phrase τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνόσ.

157 c.

The correlatives are ὅλον and μόρια: now τὸ ὅλον = πολλὰ μόρια, therefore any one μόριον is not μόριον of τὰ πολλὰ μόρια, but of τὸ ὅλον. For unless τὸ μόριον—any given part—be part of itself, there must be one part of the lot of which the given Part is not part. Consequently if the given Part be a part of many parts, it must be a part of the parts minus the given Part. But if it be a part of the other parts, it must be a part of every one of the several parts taken by them-

selves, since *quá* parts the parts are similar, and therefore must be a part of itself: *q. a. e.* *E. g.* a shilling is part of a pound, but a shilling is not a part of the several shillings which make up the pound. For, if it be a part τῶν πολλῶν shillings, it must be either a part of itself, *q. a. e.*, or of the remaining nineteen shillings. But as the other nineteen shillings, when out of relation to the pound, are nineteen totally independent units, the Part must be a part of them *quá* units, and therefore of every one of them (since there is no difference between them *quá* units), and therefore of itself, which is exactly similar to the rest. A Part is correlative to a Whole, but it has no relation whatsoever to any one or all of the other parts, save that of being a fellow-part of the same integer.

In Plato's day, abstract language was taken from Geometry; perhaps *fraction* and *integer* would be better renderings of μόριον and ὅλον. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same reasoning is triumphant against Natural Realism, substituting Quality for Part, and Body for Whole. The Natural Realist makes all qualities, minus one, depend on the residual quality; so that we have either a quality which is more than a quality, or which is not a quality. The same reasoning applies to the Antithesis of Kant's Fourth Antinomy.

157 a.

ἰόν.

Justifies the vulgate in *Phaedr.*, 249 b.

157 b.

The order of notions in the order of analysis is—

1. εἶναι;
2. γίγνεσθαι;
3. συγκρίνεσθαι;
4. ὁμοιοῦσθαι.

Order of genesis *e contra*.

157 c.

μετέχει πη.

The Platonic μέθεξις is best illustrated by the *Concret* of Hegel, *i.e.* where an object or thought is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements—to be a process in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of view; each object to be equal to itself, multiplied into all other things.—Wallace's *Hegel*, clxxvi. Cicero makes use of the same principle: semper enim ita assumit aliquid (sc. natura) ut ea quae prima dederit, ne deserat.—*De Fin.* iv. 14. It is the ideal side of the doctrine of Development.

157 c.

Here, c—τό γε ὅλον = ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν in d, = ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός.

157 d.

ἀδύνατον εἶναι : Sc. ἐστι.

Plato often uses words both in the ordinary and philosophic sense in the same passage: cf. οὐδὲ μία, 143 d : αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδου, 136 d : ἄπειρον, *Phil.* 17 e : συμφέρεσθαι, *Theaet.* 152 e.

157 e.

Τάλλα participates in Τὸ Ἐν through τὸ ὅλον; in modern language, through the notion Law, *i.e.* in the scientific meaning of the term, when “we think of the parts as held together by a certain force.” This is Hamilton's description of physical unity.—REID, 852.

158 a.

ὁ ἅν ἧ μόριον ὅλον.

So the MSS., and they are right. The conjecture μορίου ὅλον is a mere truism, for the notion Whole is the correlation

of the notion Part. But *μόριον ὄλου* is emphatic, that which is a genuine part, and not a part *per accidens*. A shilling is $\frac{1}{20}$ of the amount of silver defined to be a legal pound: it is therefore, *quá* $\frac{1}{20}$, *μόριον ὄλου*, because $\frac{1}{20} \times 20 = 1$: whereas a shilling *quá* shilling is only one amongst any number of shillings, and is only $\frac{1}{20}$ of £1, *per accidens*, just as it is $\frac{1}{100}$ of £5. Each part must be one, because the parts are *πολλά*. Cf. *οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι Τάλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἅν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὄλου, εἰ πολλά ἦν.* 159. Besides, the proposed change would require *τοῦ μορίου τὸ ὄλου*.

158 e.

The order of notions is—

1. ἄπειρα καὶ πεπερασμένα;
2. ἐναντία;
3. ἀνόμοια.

159 a.

Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον.

- (1). Τάλλα *quá* πεπερασμένα are similar;
- (2). Τάλλα *quá* ἄπειρα are similar;
- (3). Τάλλα *quá* πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα are dissimilar, both *per se* and *inter se*.

ἀμφοτέρως, i. e. as uniting two opposite predicates, a double contrariety, *ἐναλλάξ*,

- (1). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα.

- (2). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα.

159 b–160 b.

Τάλλα are capable of no predicates whatsoever, if the One be one in aloofness. The key to this section is the notion

χωρίς—aloofness—the negation of actual relation. The One is allowed to be, but is relegated to isolation.

160 a.

Illustrates Hypothesis ii., as the order of Number is

ένός, δυοῖν, τριῶν, περιττοῦ, ἀρτίου.

The order is objective, φύσει.

160 b-d.

τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Negation is considered as relative to knowledge, and thus giving rise to the notion ἕτερον—otherness—distinctness.

160 b.

The order of notions is—

1. γνωστόν;
2. ἕτερον.

The order is subjective.

160 d-163 b.

The One in this section, though non-existent, admits of positive predicates, which are contrary opposites. Here the One is granted what we would call a subjective existence.

160 e.

In scholastic language τὸ μὴ-ὄν has—

1. Illudalitas;
2. Quidditas;
3. Hocceitas.

161 b.

εἰ ἐνός.

If Τὸ Ἐν have unlikeness to one, then the argument will not turn on anything like Τὸ Ἐν, nor will the hypothesis relate to one, but to something different. That is, Τὸ Ἐν, the subject of discussion, must have unity for its essence; if not, the hypothesis deals with something else. Mr. Jowett ignores the difference between Τὸ Ἐν and εἷν.

162 b.

Τὸ μὴ ὄν has οὐσία + μὴ-οὐσία; it therefore involves μεταβολή; and therefore all incompatible predicates. Here we have Hegelianism *in concreto*, as applied to Τὸ ὄν. Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his *Philosophy of Reflection*, attacks Hegelianism on the following grounds, which apply equally to Plato's proposition. It must be premised that Mr. Hodgson uses the term *contradictory* to signify, not the opposition of general and particular, but that between a proposition and its negative, *i.e.* difference of quality only: *e.g.* A is A, A is not A; while by a *contrary* he means that the negative particle joins on to the predicate: *e.g.* A is A, A is not-A. To resume, the objection is as follows: "The evolution of the concrete concept is his (Hegel's) fundamental idea; it evolves itself by *Entgegensetzung*, a concrete opposition containing undistinguished the purely logical opposition of contradistinction, and the opposition of content, which is contrariety. The former gives the motive power, the latter the order and arrangement, of the evolution. Thus the pure Nothing, *Nichts*, at the beginning is logically opposed to the pure Being, *Sein*; hence the *movement* between them. There is no opposition of content, no difference of content at all, between them, until they are conceived *together*; then they are perceived to be different in *content*, but at the same time to be a process, a *Werden*, not (either of them) a state or thing. The Whole makes one undistinguishable process of opposition, a becoming, *Entgegensetzung*, a *Werden*. To analyse

this process, to show what is due to perception, what to conception, what part of the opposition is due to content, and what to logical contradiction, would be to destroy it as a theory of the universe."—Vol. I. pp. 384, 5. Again: "Of two wholly contradictory terms, the one is thought as existent, the other as non-existent." "The negative member of a pair of contradictory terms, which is a pure creature of logical method, analogous to imaginary quantities in mathematics, is treated by Hegel as if it were a concept with a perceptual content. The "*Nichts*" at the beginning of the *Logik* is the first instance of it."—p. 382.

The question is, What is the value of a creature of logic? And here comes in the work of Kant. Kant showed that the intelligible element was indispensable. The universe was not a lot of separate things, set in an intellectual substratum, like stars in the heavens. No; the intelligible was required both for the stars and for the space in which they float. Be this theory as it may, it was extended by Hegel to the object; hence, in *rerum natura*, the intelligible element has more reality than its content, so far as that content is sensible. But as logic is the explicit statement of the intelligible, it follows that the logical form has more *Wahrheit* than its sensible padding. As to negation, which is the point of the process, Mr. Hodgson makes it arise from our fixing our attention on some one in a train of differentials (p. 376). But surely things are different because they are already differenced, and the logical description of differentiation is Otherness, or Negation. And as before, the Negation of Logic is more real than the same material of sensation.

162 a.

I. e. δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ-᾽ὄν ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι (εἰ μέλλει μὴ-εἶναι), ὁμοίως ὥσπερ δεῖ τὸ ᾽ὄν ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-᾽ὄν δεσμὸν τοῦ εἶναι, ἵνα τελείως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ.

I. e. Τὸ μὴ-᾽Ον requires as a security for its existence as μὴ-᾽όν, that the proposition should be affirmative; *i. e.*

Τὸ μὴ-᾽Ον is μὴ-᾽όν;

and Τὸ ᾽Ον requires in the same way that the proposition should be negative; *i. e.*

Τὸ ᾽Ον is not μὴ-᾽όν.

Here Plato apparently regards affirmation and negation as an affection of the copula. The reasoning assumes that *contrarium eadem scientia*. This is true of reflex, but not of direct consciousness. Of course all Philosophy is reflex.

162 a.

μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας (μὲν) τοῦ εἶναι-᾽όν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-᾽όν. μὲν is understood after the first οὐσίας by a common ellipse: cf. τὸ δὲ μὴ-᾽όν, μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-᾽όν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-᾽όν. For sense see preceding note, *ib. b.*

162 a.

I. e. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-᾽όν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-᾽όν (ἀλλὰ ἀνήσει τι τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ-᾽όν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-᾽όν), εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται ὄν.

ἀλλὰ introduces the same proposition in another form, thus:—

εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-᾽όν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-᾽όν = the non-existent *is* non-existent: an affirmative proposition: ἀλλὰ introduces it in another form: if the non-existent gives up its being non-existent, and becomes not being the non-existent, the negatives are cancelled, and the non-existent exists.

It may be rendered, “if it does allow the affirmative essence of the Copula—the *is*—to merge in the negative essence of the

Predicate—the *is not*—the Copula becomes *is not*, and thereby cancels the *is-not* of the Predicate.”

ἀνήσει is metaphorically the correlative of *δεσμός*, *infra*, unless it hold fast by and not let its is slip into is-not.

163 b-164 b.

In this proposition, *τὸ ἐν* is totally deprived of *ἔστι*, and the emphasis is on *οὐσίας ἀπουσία*.

164 a-b.

This conclusion is apparently the same as that of the First Hypothesis. In reality nothing can be more diverse. In the former case, The One possesses actually no predicate in particular, although, as the second proposition shows, it is capable of combining with all predicates whatsoever. In the latter case, The One has actually no predicate at all, because it is incapable of having any.

164 b-165 e.

In this proposition *οὐσία* is taken away from the *τὸ ἐν*, and the effect on *τᾶλλα* is considered. The result is *φαίνεσθαι*, *i. e.* a presented unity in things, somewhat like the Cause and Substance of Hume, mere fictions. This is the view set forth by Brown, Lect. V. The emphasis is on *φαίνεται*.

164 b.

This proposition represents the views held by the majority of British philosophers and scientific men of the present day. Unity exists only in the mind; the object, according to circumstances, is only a majus or a minus in Quantity, Quality, or Degree.

165 e, to end.

δόξα.

In this proposition, οὐσία is totally denied of τὸ ἐν : what amount of οὐσία, then, can τᾶλλα retain? None whatever; not even the impression—δόξα—can be produced by τᾶλλα. That is to say, in The non-existence of The One, τᾶλλα cannot produce in us the idea of quasi-unity allowed in the last hypothesis. Real unity being no more, artificial unity is gone too. Hume's quasi-idea is impossible.

166 a.


MSS. ὑπό, rightly. The meaning is, the δόξα τὸ μὴ ὄν is never produced by τᾶλλα. ὑπό is applied to the action of a notion, διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου, sc., ἐνὸς—πάθος. *Soph.* 245 d, e. δοξάζω is used passively in this dialogue.

166 c.

ἀληθέστατα.

This is the solemn conclusion, the amen of the exposition. Nothing can be in worse taste than to censure the dialogue as ἄπυος. An ethical discourse, which deals with our emotions, may conclude with an allegory; but a discussion like the *Parmenides*, conducted with mathematical formality and colourlessness, would show against the gorgeousness of a Platonic myth, somewhat like the Parthenon in a transformation scene.

APPENDICES.



APPENDIX A.

THE fragments of Zeno, which illustrate the notion *Tὰ πολλὰ* and its results, are as follows:—

1. *εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. Εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα ἔστιν ὅσα ἔστι, πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη.* Which conclusion conflicts with *Tὸ ἕν.*

2. *εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξύ. Καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί.* Which conclusion conflicts with the former, and both with *Tὸ ἕν.*

3. *εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρὰ τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μὲν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι.* Zeno here points out the true objection to the atom and space as metaphysical ultima: the atom is all quality, and space is all quantity.

Zeno's arguments against motion bring the fact, when analysed, into collision with *Tὸ ἕν.* Thus motion takes place from point to point, therefore within determinate limits: therefore, to make motion rational, intelligible things must be *πεπερασμένα: q. a. e.* Again, the space between the points is *ἄπειρον: q. a. e.*

The Flying Arrow is made comprehensible by Mr. Proctor's *Photographs of a Galloping Horse*.* At a given moment, the horse is point-blank to the plate. Professor Monck's objection, that the body might move during the breaks,† would have served Zeno, for it would bring out his point that rest is motion and motion rest.

Plato makes much use of Zeno; for Τὸ ὅλον, being ἐν εἰρήνῃ, is on the way to motion.

* *Gentleman's Magazine*, December, 1881.

† Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 98.

APPENDIX B.

ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.


PLATO'S method of specification is given most fully in the *Philebus*, 14 c-18 d. It has nothing to do with referring, say, an individual man to the class Man, a process which is justly caricatured in ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. If the man is in the class, why do you take him out of it? If he is not in it, how do you get him into it? By a medium, which must be related, and both; therefore ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος is irrepressible.

The Platonic process states that there is a unity which can be discerned; that such unity is one pole, while the other is lost in indefiniteness, τὸ ἀπειρον; that the investigator must discover and count the varieties which lie between the two limits, and in that way approach real unity; and when such unity is discovered, we may then disregard the endless variety of intermediate details. It is, therefore, a process of positive research, and not a barren negative. The thing is to be found, if we search, εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. The basis of the process is Τὸ ἓν, just as the basis of Aristotle's view is the existence of γένη in nature. Mill, similarly, has to build his logic on causation, as he understands it; but, to the consistent empirical, there can be no basis of logic except τὸ

συμβεβηκός. "All things," says Hegel, "are a judgment: that is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves. They are a universal, which is individuality. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other."* Plato's process, as well as Hegel's, is safe against *ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, which no empirical logic is.

* Wallace's *Hegel*, p. 258.

FINIS.



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Maguire.

NAME OF BORROWER.

Doyle grad
Doyle grad.
Tropicy. grad.
Laska, stud
~~Stamm~~ grad

